THE BAY OF PIGS OPERATION

Volume III  Evolution of CIA's Anti-Castro Policies,
1950 - January 1961

Part I
Background

A. Watching from the Sidelines

Fidel CASTRO RUZ was identified in one of the earliest reports in Agency files as "one of the young, 'student leaders' in Cuba, who manages to get himself involved in many things that do not concern him." 1/ Beginning in 1948, the activities of Fidel Castro came to be of increasing concern to the Central Intelligence Agency and to the United States Government (USG). By early 1960 the USG officially adopted a covert action program designed to remove the Castro government from control of the island of Cuba. The policy of the USG was to be carried out by the Central Intelligence Agency and would culminate in the operations at the Bahia de Cochinos from 17-19 April 1961.

Beginning in 1948 and continuing even after the United States had formulated its official policy of
* Bureau for the Repression of Communist Activities.

...sentinelle among other things, that...in Havana, Lucien Vinton Chapin, told the CIA...report of the American Embassy (Ambassayer) -- to the Consulate of the American Government (BRAC).

(Summary report) -- apparently in response to a request from the American military intelligence service to President Batista's military and intelligence services, investigations of alleged subversive and antidemocratic communist activities in Havana.

Embassy offices in Havana.

Considerable part of the reporting from the American Embassy in Havana is based on the records of the Agency, as received in the mid-1950's. When it appeared that the Agency depended in...of these questions is reflected in various answers to these questions, the nature of the Agency, the interest controlled and the interests of the Agency.

What is the Agency doing to remove the Castro from the leadership of the Cuban government? The practical questions faced by the Department of Western Hemisphere Division, by the Department of State, and by the State Department, and by other concerned government agencies in the United States...
\[ \sqrt{5} \] and were his basic feelings toward the US extraordinarily.

would Castro have sufficient force to cost Bautista
continuing concern to the US Intelligence Community
reporting also reflected another of the problems of
having Embassy
in gangster-type activities. "Having Embassy
did note that in his student days, he was involved
was a Communist could not be substantiated, but state
similar vein well into 1957, charges that Castro
the tenor of State reporting continued in a

\[ \sqrt{3} \] retail Castro.

case of renewed interest by the State Department in
indicated that he was furnishing the information be-
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division, the Cos having
his university days, and in forwarding the report to
Communists, or Communist sympathizers, ever since
which indicated that Castro had been tied in with
paragraph by paragraph bases, all of the allegations
the Department of State reporter referred to a

\[ \sqrt{2} \] is a rather poor one. But the result
make Castro a "rogue", but the result to
apparently been slanted in an effort to
period 1948-1950. This summary has
made against retail Castro during the
summary of allegations and accusations
The S/M report is nothing more than

[Date: 4/7/70]

Released Per PL-102-826(URK Act)

TOP SECRET
General in November 1971. 8

...General, an organization of the same name, has not
helped organize this group, but the present author has not
persuaded the present author. The letter of protest attached
to the copy of the memorandum from the Inspector General,
which was intercepted by the Secret Service, attached a cryptic note to the copy
of this letter, which read: "Two in the IC's.

David R. McLean, a former member of the IC's.

In fact, AGENCY SUPPORT

'The Cuban President to write to the DC, Allen Dulles,
the Cuban President to write to the DC, Allen Dulles,
who is accompanied by US Ambassador Gardner and

Lyman Kirkpatrick, CIA's Inspector General,

principally in propaganda activities.

The efforts of an anti-communist organization engaged
popular and agency funds also were used to support
the Cuban Communist Party, the PSP (Partido Socialista
approved PI Projects, most of which were aimed at

In the mid-1950's, Havana Station ran seven
nated to undertake such a mission to Cuba.

A year or more has passed since the Red's Party's secret mission to Cuba, which was designed to negotiate with Castro. At the time, the Red's Party, who also stood high in the ranks of the Red's Party, were also looked upon with interest.

William M. Patsey of the American business association, who also operated a significant contact in Cuba and Peru, and an

It is interesting to speculate whether at this time Kirkpatrick was thinking of William D. Patsey.

Latin American Affairs and a former member of the

Adolfo Perete, one of the country's leading experts on

William Welman of the Department of State, noted the

then a week following the Kirkpatrick memorandum,

Kirkpatrick memorandum on 25 November 1957, less

Although it may have had no relation to the

pronounced position.* a

being unable to withdraw from the

interruption of the Red's Party's demands, and then

doomed to failure by each side, probably

tofore the Red's Party. Any public

announcement or certainty not advertised

results achieved either not ever publicly

would have to be done covertly, and any

work out a possible "cease fire." This

groups in the Red's Party government and

mediary between the various opposition

would have the ability to act as Inter-

"assumed" to be backed by Washington and

connected with the US government and

a US citizen, in some way known to be

on the island of Cuba, probably only

November 1957 was the following:

estimating suggestion made by the Inspector General in

In view of subsequent developments, one Inter-

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able to assist 29 US soldiers and marines and 15 US
"captured" by Raúl Castro's forces in order to be
Robert D. McChesney, Cuba, Santiago de Cuba, got himself
observed their tactics in combat. In June 1958,
forces in the mountains for a period of two weeks and
1958, one agency officer managed to join the Castro
were successfully placed in P3F ranks, and in March
priority concern of the field. At least two agents
penetration of the Partido Socialista Popular was a
Che Guerera and Raúl Castro's brother, then
proceed to this point. His two principal deputies, Brito
Castro's government, and particularly the pro-Castro
concerned about the pro-communist orientation of
By early 1958, the agency had become sufficiently

It seems that a rather large number of that region
where quite aside from the properties, and
proprietors for keeping order in the farms.
It is rough going, and intervention is
Bereld, with remarkable persistence, noted:

Orderly conclusion: "10"

done to bring the Cuban revolt to any kind of an
concerning to Bereld, to see whether anything can be
State Department, that he was en route to Cuba, ac-
19 US businessmen and 27 servicemen were captured. The historian for WH Division provided the figures.

The additional support from the OSS and Perquin Bosch, who had broken with Castro (for example, Pepe Paez) in conjunction with some of the more enlightened Cubans by cooperation among Latin American liberals working hope that the Castro situation could be remedied of the Castro movement in Cuba. 13\* Berite was most about the possible ways to combat the growing strength State Department) continued to reflect their concern as Adolf Berite and his friends (both in and out of constituent was communist or not, others such de Cuba base had in Oriente Province. Whether Castro's great frequency during 1958 from contacts the sanctuaries additional documentation of the pro-communist atmosphere among the Ra\"ul Castro forces. 12\*

tone, according to one source, which a found "definite communist over- American nature of the Castro movement. According unharmed; and both reported on the "radical" and anti-

In both instances, the agency representatives returned businessmen who had been kidnapped by Ra\"ul Castro.
be arms and ammunition. All dropping of effective means of help to Castro would endanger United States interests with Batista. The most obvious solution is so not to endanger United States interests.

Obviously, the support must be given to the United States government.

that he speaks with the authority of such background that it is clear that he should be chosen to make the contact should be the United States interests. With some of his objectives, and that with the United States interests, in this matter would be to make secret contact with Castro, a practical way to protect United

Cox suggested that:

our efforts to drop up Batista. To accomplish this, our attitude toward the United States because of was on the way out, we should now try to remedy Castro's. It was apparent, according to Cox, that since Batista's, Castro's efforts for the Agency would be to join Castro. Cox suggested that Castro's efforts for the Agency would be to join Castro.

of the clandestine service. Rather than trying to military division, political, and psychological staff, Castro movement were increasing, a rather different at a time when the Agency's fears about the

of State. In the only major participation from the US Department --
one might surmise, a Catholic priest.

The source for this evaluation of Castro was, as

spared, commanded, or influenced."

To label the revolutionary movement as Communist-
inapt, President Femandez Batista's att

Source comment: The United States should

In the Castro regime, therefore, have your chaplains,

under the Castro's, therefore, have your chaplains,

and his troops in the Sierra Maestra. The rebel forces

in the Sierra Maestra, and one has joined Femandez Batista

his followers are good Catholics. Three Catholic

Number-five percent of.

Calling as a reason for this: "

indicated that Castro deified Castro was not a Communist,

believed against Castro. One report in the fall of 1958

Not all Agency reporting out of the Cuban area was

pending subsequent free, democratic elections. When

been elected in the rigged election, but by a minor

takedown, not by the presidential candidate who had

aggressively and to have the government of the country

supported a plan to have Batista bow out of power in the

Agency in conjunction with the Department of State

By late fall of 1958, when it became apparent

best. *15

of arms and money would probably be

purchase his own arms. A combination

the money to Castro, who could then

secure means of help would be strong

probably be a better method. The most

crew to evade our coast guard would

load of equipment manned by a Cuban

the security aspect. Allowing a ship-

This equipment might be dangerous from
Object was that various of these members would have dates for the Junta, and, according to King, the Junta were identified as possible candidates. Various individuals were identified as possible candidates for the government. Battista also was to be overthrown. Should there ever be a truly violent coup, those close to him, particularly those whose lives would be endangered, should be assured that his security is protected. It is agreed that Battista should be overthrown. The representatives of the Department of State would be responsible for ensuring that the military Junta is not a significant threat to the support of the Department of State. In return, if Battista is warning the Cubans, acting on information from the Cubans, someone has been trustworthy. Battista was a long-time acquaintance and would have Battista's support in Cuba. It is expected that Battista will discuss a plan with William Howard. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Col. J. C. King, would meet with William, and Henry Holland, former assistant traveling to meet with William.
therefore would be a blood bath; and that he had both for fear of being called a coward and traitor; that reasons why he couldn't possibly give up the office--battista made no promises, and went through theway out. J/7

but said he could not take the junta, much of battista's sympathy, he agreed with, battista without pulling any punches. this evening, he said his plan before pavley met with battista for two hours

port from havanna station:

place on 11 december 1958 when, according to the rel: The meeting between pavley and battista actually took unlikely that battista would accept the proposals, however, the foreign minister told pavley that it was indicated that he was going to make, unfortunately, who strongly supported the proposals that pavley

immediacy meetings with the cuban foreign minister, thing on 6 december in havanna he had a set of pre-

following the meeting in miami, pavley did

sufficient political strength to weaken castro's sup-

TOP SECRET

NARA ZA 3
DATE 11/12/56
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In addition, the representative of the Archbishop of Havana, though [illegible], US government could have indicated to the Ambassador that:

19 Foreign Service Officers which Father had indicated to the representative of the Archbishop of Havana, that the United States government recommended that and that there were matters now mostly minor caused by present situation. Also said that these should be attempted and mutual understanding and resolution reached.

Both had important stakes in sugar crop and both desired Castro's and US interests. Although a Castro take over was inevitable:

- between the two countries the priest emphasized that
- that some proposals for resolving the difference be

Father had approached the American Consul in Santiago to represent the representative of the Archbishop of Havana, rather than the US government regarding Cuba were amicable. A action in Cuba deteriorated rapidly and the policies of

Following Pawley's visit with Battista, the situation:

- on part of Battista 18 developments may produce change of attitude developed elections. However, regardless of a change of election, however, important in that has been named president-elect. The President-elect, who makes every effort turn government over to Battista will not accept plan, and with

Pawley's evaluation of the meeting as follows:

NOTE: Pawley, J a
DATE: 61/1/1955
RELEASED PER P.L. 102-526 (F.R.K. Act)
into position to see if he could locate dissidents who
surveyed possible drop zones and [3] to get himself
3 were sent to Havana -- [7] to locate and
and [3]
representatives of PMD to establish a small contingency task
force, capable of making air drops into Cuba. Two
division (PMD) to establish a small contingency task
put forward, PM division had asked the parliametary

At about the same time this proposal was being

21/2
National Catholic Welfare Organization. 21
Perhaps candidate could be found through
political forces for a long time to come.
and his movement, both will be important
regardless how we may feel about Castro.
be found for job and dispatched quickly.
discharged it fully qualified person could
have a station feels proposal merits
HAVANA HAVANA, station feels proposal merits

had proposed to the American Consulate, saying:

position that the Archbishop of Havana's representative
HAVANA cabled headquarters strongly supporting the
by agency personnel in Cuba, on 18 December 1958, COS
of PMD Castro and his cohorts had been clearly stated
Despite the fact that the Communist representatives

be well received. 20

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TOP SECRET
were both anti-Castro and anti-Batista. What WH hoped to accomplish, presumably, was that they could organize these anti-Batista and anti-Castro dissidents and get them armed in time so that they could prevent Castro from taking over the government if Batista should suddenly resign or decide to flee the country. 22/

On 31 December 1958, Paramilitary Division reported to WH Division that a Helio Courier was already in place in Key West with a backup Helio in Washington; a sterile C-54 had been requested from Europe; and the Office of Logistics would have an arms load rigged for a drop by 2 January 1959. 23/

It was not until the last week of December 1958 that President Eisenhower became actively involved in discussions and decisions affecting US policy toward Cuba. His interest was precipitated by a 23 December 1958 Memorandum on Cuba which had been prepared by the Acting Secretary of State and sent to Eisenhower's National Security Adviser, Gordon Gray, who discussed the memorandum with Eisenhower and the DCI on 26 December. The President apparently indicated that he had not been fully aware of the positions of State and CIA
regarding Castro, and he suggested that meetings of the Special Group under NSC 5412/2 should be held on a weekly basis, with Cuba to be a regular subject for discussion.

Gordon Gray and Allen Dulles had some differences of opinion concerning the advisability of reading other individuals into the act. Gray suggested that the President's Board of Consultants (later the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board) be made party to the discussions, but Dulles rather strongly suggested that there was a significant difference between the discussions which were intended for the Special Group 5412 on Covert Operations, and PFIAB responsibilities for general problems related to foreign intelligence. Dulles made the specific point that if the Board of Consultants was going to get involved in the details of planned covert operations, they were then in a position of reviewing US foreign policy. The discussion also seems to have verged on the right of Congress to attempt to oversee covert operations -- a point about which Eisenhower expressed himself very strongly, noting that such action by Congress would be an infringement of his prerogative as Commander-in-Chief.