people who favored Batista.

staged reports which I had to

not be in the best interests of the United

Intelligence Agency suggested for the

merit time that a Castro victory might

during the rush of these last events

called this period in the following manner:

with some benefit of hindsight, Bushhower re-

\[ \sqrt{25} \]

withheld Castro and his followers to take over the Cuban

e a junta to succeed Batista, rather than permitting

the US take the responsibility for naming members to

were discussed. There also was some suggestion that

interception by US marines was among the topics that

a possible US action, including direct

as the meeting was in progress, Batista was preparing

which the Cuban situation was again discussed. Even

e the CNO; General Cabel; DDC; and Gordon Gray at

State; Irwin, Department of Defense; Admiral Burke,

mess, Herter, Murphy, and Robottom, Department of

there was another high level meeting attended by

At 3:40 on the afternoon of 31 December 1958,
of the Army that while he was aware that Havana had 
assured the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence 
overruled by Headquarters, however, and General Cabell 
the station's own capabilities in this area. COS was 
COS took strong exception to the proposals, emphasizing 
that the station's own capabilities were under commercial cover in Havana, 
provide support for the Army's covered collection of 
In fact, when the US Army suggested that the station 
especially on the developing military capabilities, 
that it was cognizant of all of Castro's movements, 
changes in government. The station seemed assured 
as Havana station attempted to keep track of the 
castro's take over, there was a flurry of activity 
during the first few weeks of 1959 following 
B. Castro takes over

\[
\text{ munish had penetrated this hemisphere. 26} \\
\text{ that with the coming of Castro, com-} \\
\text{ were gradually drawing them to the conclu-} \\
\text{ and I testified for a number of months, events} \\
\text{ and report against}
\]

at another point, the ex-president wrote:

castro had not been given carte, 
'estimate, I was provided that such a con- 
when I heard the government. "I thought 
takes over, they will probably participate

\[\text{NARA J 9 date 11/7/63}
\]

\[\text{RELEASED PER PL-102-26(OK ACH)}\]

\[\text{FOR SECRET}\]
be made. 24/25

Westmoreland area and that a better choice than Lt. Col.

the term "Jack" - that General Brinkley (Army Special
Paramilitary Division) reported - without ever using
the Chief, Foreign Intelligence Staff, at COA, Chief,
the Chief, Western Hemisphere Division, and to the

Chief of the Army, Army Intelligence Division, and to the

an interesting side note to the discussions at this

soon or later [1 August] likely to ask for major increases

National Intelligence Estimate that, at most, Castro
believed was supported in early March 1959 by a Special

threat, saw any threat to this installation, and this
day, but neither CIA nor State Department Representative

was the existence of the naval base at Guantanamo

likely threat to relations with the United States.

The most likely threat to relations with the United States

to get along with the United States. 24/25

There probably that Castro would soon find that he would have

among other things, one report emphasized the proba-
difficult time holding his government together, and

in Havana were predetermining that Castro would have a

in those early weeks of 1959, US representatives

had been "instructed" to cooperate. 24/25

objected to the Army's proposals, the COS nonetheless
that he would appeal to the workers, the farmers, the heads of the State Department and to the press, but that Castro would probably make his pitch not to the act when he arrived in the United States, suggesting that did an excellent job of predicting how Castro would have been the idol of the masses. "32", Castro was "the idol of the masses", but at the same time he emphasized that upper classes, but at the same time he emphasized that Cuba's popularity was very low among the middle and new Cuban government, Castro had made an indication that pointing to the serious economic difficulties of the within a matter of months. 31

Washington visit can make or break

Information:

Portance of the Castro trip. He noted for headquarters.

COs Havaña revealed ambigious feelings about the trip, known that he was planning to visit the United States, in the early spring of 1959, as Castro made changes. "30"

distinction abigesist Cuban workers, and perhaps other.

revision of employment practices which appeared as the "normal rent now paid for the Guantánamo base,
Despite Castro's apparent simplicity, that:

Robert Murphy, Deputy Undersecretary of State noted

power's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs,

In a memorandum to Gordon Gray, President Eisen-

result of this visit to the United States. 34

undergone a serious change of heart, as a

major indication to date that Fidel has

It would be unwise to assume from the

dispatches as follows:

the Castro visit. COs have shared in the general agreement about the results of

Having been in general agreement about the results of

the US. 33/ both the Department of State and COs

in the US. 33/ both the Department of State and COs

trous with reporters to stick to Castro while he was

serious consideration to plans for embarrassing Cuba-

Government, COs did suggest that headquarters give

guestion about who would eventually control the Cuban

communist positions, and moreover, there was little

communists and had taken no stand in opposition to

opinion among communists, was heavily intertwined with

make no mistake that the Castro Government, while not

revolution. COs emphasized that headquarters should

students, and the masses in America to support his
Reform law, 36

effectively against stringent agrarian
difficult for U.S. interests to protest
stand is so
ed reforms that current
token he could reverse trend at any time,
Communist popular position. By same
castors, who with few words made anti-
demonstration once again, enormous power
but possibly most significant aspect is.
these demonstrations undoubtedly welcome.

thing in the Cuban press, one dispatch speculated that:

an apparent rash of anti-communist statements appear-
dately after Castro’s return to Cuba. Remarking on
significant development which surfaced almost in time
United States the crisis have many have misjudged a
this period shortly following Castro’s visit to the
with the benefit of hindsight, it seems that in

\[ \sqrt{35} \]

with him and his government. 35

of developing a constructive relationship
very than the foregoing about the possibility
matters before assuming a more optimistic
should weigh his decisions on specific
before, Castro remained an enigma; and we
while we certainly know him better than
great personal courage and conviction of
a strong personality and a born leader of
and ignorance on many matters, he is clearly
appearance of material, unrelenting
attempt to understand the man. With all this
of Cuba. If would be a serious mistake
difficult man to deal with on his return
public reaction which may make him a more
against a valuable knowledge of American
from his experience here, he has
eventually reached course of history reversed the
probably that Castro had altered the
the revolution, and that the

26 July movement in the Directory Revolutionary (the
source, however, noted that the liberal forces of the
seriousness that he made some unwise statements. The
and this threat had struck Castro as so
Communists, the United States would cut off economic
Castro that unless he broke his alliance with the
on escalation's talk, Vice-President Nixon had told
the United States. According to the source reporting
remaraks which Castro had been forced to make while in
Conservative statement was trying to take advantage of
the Left and the Right, and he emphasized that the
laid it on the line that there was a struggle between
made while he was in the United States, Abdul Escalante
party members regarding statements that Castro had
popular (psp) with reference to the confusion among
the Executive Secretary of the Partido Socialista
Communist factions. Reporting on comments made by
waged within Cuba between the pro- and the anti-
the depth of the struggle which was, in fact, being
cited above provided a more accurate insight as to
A follow-up dispatch within two days of that
had coordinated the paper, Fidel Castro was not
division and the department of state with whom Gomez
and reflecting the views of both Western Hemisphere
association was prominently featured. At this time,
Research Institute of America, Castro’s communist
report on Cuba “for distribution to members of the
assisted Leo Chun in the preparation of an urgent
chief of western hemisphere division, Rudolph Gomex,
continually occurred. In August 1959, when the Deputy
that was begun by CoS Havana in early June, this topic
the intelligence community; and in the weekly reporting
continued to be a major subject of discussion within
1959, the degree of Castro’s commitment to communism
through the summer and into the early fall of
\[ \sqrt{38} \]
work. 38
and to carry on further organizational
tion to exert influence in this regard,
control Castro, but they are in a post-
The Communists probably do not now
Cuba had not been decimated. The SINE commented:
ministry again indicated that the internal situation in
in the Caribbean through 1959, the intelligence com-
in a special NIF of 30 June 1959 on the situation
\[ \sqrt{37} \]
the counterrevolutionaries. 37
considered to be a Communist. His brother Raul Castro, however, was clearly identified as a hard-core Communist.* 39/

The internal problem to which Anibal Escalante had referred in mid-summer came to a head in mid-October 1959 when Hubert Matos, a military leader in Camaguey Province and formerly a strong supporter of Castro, broke with Fidel over the increasing number of leadership positions which were being turned over to members of the Communist oriented PSP rather than to members of the 26 July Movement. Matos resigned as military leader of Camaguey on 19 October 1959 and was arrested on 20 October. During the months prior to his trial in December 1959, when he was found guilty of treason and sentenced to 20 years imprisonment, a

* In view of the trend of recent years, it is interesting to note that the Churh report found reason to be somewhat critical of the Senate Internal Security Committee (Sen. Eastland's Committee) for getting involved in matters which were principally of concern to the intelligence community. In this case, the Senate Committee was criticized specifically for taking Diaz Lanz, the head of Castro's Air Force who had defected, and questioning him before turning him over to the intelligence agencies for initial interrogation.
porting on his visit with COS Havana, comes noted that
the Station was urged to take advantage of opportunities
who were P2 or P5 destitute, but everyone in
must efforts to Havana should not be limited to
persons. Some also pointed out that the anti-comm-
tation were rewarded with COS Havana and Station
of the best of the agents who might conduct this pen-
PRP. In the course of this tour, the quaillifications
the increase in Station efforts to penetrate the
Rudy Gomez, was in Havana (15-18 October 1959) promot-
to Moreo’s restoration, the Deputy Chief of WH Division,
concentrated to the internal struggle that led
said, this was the second civil war for Castro. 40
revolution not in banking. As the estate derailed has
and replaced by the Guatera, whose expertise was in
head of the National Bank who was removed by Castro
Manuel Ray, Minister of Public Works and Pelayo
Property; Rulo Lopez-Preaspy, Minister of Finance;
Perez, Minister for Recovery of Illegal Acquired
also broke with Castro. Among those were Pelayo
number of others who had been prominent anti-Ballistasna.
for support on such an issue is difficult to imagine. For
example, that the station had to request Headquarters
and State were remiss in the training of their overseas
and it would appear from this request that both the DPP

was there any indication when such paper might be
yet had not been received by the end of October. Nor
thing to King, had been promulgated as early as May
policy action paper on Cuba--a paper which, accord-
department of State’s failure to provide CIA with a
intelligence with a memorandum complaining about the
division, was going forward to the director of Central
activities, J. C. King, chief of Western Hemisphere
trues in Havana. Assistance in understanding Communist
even as Gomez was promoting State’s represent-

/\ King’s approval to comply with this request. * It
be recognized. Upon his return Gomez returned J. C.
operated and how Communists working under cover could
on Communist doctines, particularly on their modus
havens to induceCommunist appropriate Embassy officers
if CIA could “send a qualified Communist expert to
the program being advanced,” and, in fact, asked Gomez
Embassy in Havana also were very much interested in

the ambassador and other members of the American

NARA 38 DATE 6/24/73
REOASED PER PL-102-326 (FRK ACT)
In an attempt to resolve, at least part of the question of whether Fidel was a communist, General C. Caball stated, "The Cuban Embassy has been consulted and the Department that such consultations were to be held.

Despite the fact that there had been indications from Washington on two occasions, but in neither instance expected, despite numerous meetings with Department
King, Chief, WH Division prepared a memorandum for the
C. On 11 December 1959, C.

field, another and more significant program was being
even as the RMD was being dispatched to the

level. 44 change in policy at the policy-mak
and empathy/distractions discouraged pending a
undertake urgent action should be properly
planning. In fact any disposition to
be approved of this contingency would any

assess or under no circumstances would any
commitment of assets be persisted or be prevailed over
on view of the development point
future viability from a paramilitary point
should be evaluated in terms of possible
a contingency, each existing asset
will be re-examined. In planning for such
against attacks against Castro
accomplishment Communist objectives, the
Cuban government is Communist-led or Com-
If it should be established that the

forceful means.
ditions described above without resorting
the government, and to eliminate the con-
early operation should support overt efforts
that deserve our respect and support. Co-
Communist, with legitimate reform goals.
revolutionary government is basically non-
be carried out on the assumption that the

For the moment, CIA operations should

Further notice. "The RMD stated in part as follow:

6 November 1959 and would remain in effect until

DATE 4/11/70
RELEASED PER PL-102-286(UK) ACT
SECRET
Footnote continued on following page

regarding the Agency's commitment to assassination
subsequent interrogations, hearings, and publicity.
1959 J. C. King memorandum to the DCI. In light of
page 296 which reproduces the original. 11 December
The reader's attention is drawn to Appendix A (see

\[ \sqrt{45} \]

certifies the fall of the present govern-
disappearance of Fidel would greatly ac-
many informed people believe that the
the same measure appeal to the masses.
of his companion the Guerrora [sic], have
close to Fidel, such as his brother Raúl
throughout consideration be given to the

Colonel King then went on to suggest that:

within Cuba.

3. Formation of pro-US opposition groups

2. Invasion operations against Castro's

1. Conduct intelligence raids against Cuban

chute among other items the following:

objectively, Chief, WH/D put forward a program to
months after assumption of office, "To achieve this
the United States which will call for elections 6
one year, and his replacement by a Junta Extensively to
specifically objectives "The overthrow of Castro within
Director of Plans, forwarding a program having as its
Director of Central Intelligence, through the Deputy

DATE 11/11/59

RELEASED PER PL-102-526 (RK ACT)
M. Dutts, on 12 December 1959, curtailed by Richardson & Blatt and approved by Allen, with the personnel corrections noted above, was con-
tinued. Colonel King's memorandum of 12 December 1959, drafted in the course of the day after Phillip Opper-
son's memo, was not formally charged with the conduct of the program. The Agency's anti-Castro program was neither charged
nor supported in this volume by this volume. The author has made the point that the com-
ments which generated the charge of Kingsley were not published or presented.

At a later point in the same paragraph the
phrase appeared: "...the word "removed" for the word "disappeared"."

for Central Intelligence’ held a joint briefing
as 1960 began. General Cabell, the Deputy Director,
including the military, would repeat vociferously: “46
that if there was direct US intervention, most Cubans
threat to Castro’s continued rule, and it pointed out
despite internal difficulties, The SINS saw no serious
intelligence estimate, "The situation in the Caribbean
As 1959 drew to a close, a final Special National
gence agency which would culminate at the Bay of Pigs.

the serious anti-Castro programs by Central Intelli-
1960 briefing can be used to denote the beginning of
during the past year. This 8 January
some degree of military action, all of which had been conducted in
- Fare, political action, economic action, and para-
- covert programs aimed at Castro - psychological war-
discussed the need for increased covert and semi-
the Castro government. At this time, the DCI also
affiliated with the Communist Party were executing
creasing hold that the Communist ideology and those
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He reviewed the in-
(8 January 1960) on Cuba for the Department of State

DATE 6/17/59
NARA 33 4-P-PL 102-526 (FK ACT)
RELEASED PER PL 102-526 (FK ACT) FOR SECR.