and formally one of the principals.

Division was Jacob D. Estefanía, recently returned from the new branch in Western Hemisphere.

and 2 at San Diego Base. 2 at Havana Station.

40 persons, with 18 at Headquarters, 20 at Havana Station.

The initial task force to run the proposed Cuban op-

as early as the WH Division organized Branch 4 (WM/4) as

The instruction was taken to heart, for on 18 Jan-

angles. It is evident from all possible

special task force to insure that we were

requested Dick Blessell to organize a

the situation in Cuba, the Director of

there was considerable discussion of

1960. White's diary noted:

In reporting on the DGI's morning meeting of 8 January

colonel I. K. White, then Deputy Director for Support,

to deal with the matter of Fidel Castro was noted by

The first mention of a formal Agency structure

A. Organizing for covert action (January-March 1960)

Castro Must Go

Part II
try to the story noted above, as told by Est我对・

WM/4. Bissell made no mention of this, and it is con-

select by the DDP, Richard Bissell, to be the head of

The author had heard that Estellite had been directly

deploy director for plans (DDP) during the course of

and the relationship between King and Richard Bissell,

between Estellite and J. C. King, Chief, WM Division

confidence in my judgment." The relationship

he got the job because J. C. King "had pretty much

in World War II with the OSS, Estellite thinks that

episode and his extensive guerrilla warfare experience

In addition to his participation in the Guatemalan

1960 that Estellite became Chief, WM/4. 3/1

Shortly after his return to the States in January of

headquarters to work on the Cuban problem. It was

by King about remaining in the Army for two years more. In

of his two-year tour in the best of Estellite's reconstruction, toward the end

of the choice of J. C. King, Chief, WM Division; and to

of Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala in 1954. Estellite was

in the overthrow of the communist-dominated government

in Project Probuscess, the operation which had resulted


DATE 4/1/72
RELEASED PER PL-102-26(TEX AC)
was going on and was thoroughly involved in the day of but according to Blinder, Col. King always knew what King on the outer edges of the anti-Castro activity indicated that there was a deliberate attempt to keep

but the time of the Bay of Pigs Operation has

Walter Blinder, formerly Special Assistant to Allen

his orders from the DDP. 6.
build-up and invasion attempt and took the chief of the Cuban unit, during the show. Jacob D. Presutti... was the tended that J. C. King was running the was in another building and no one pe- division, the Cuban Headquarters, unit the key personnel were detailed from WH the Assistant Secretary. Although some of presidential level. Although some of decisions were made at the DDP, D/C, or decisions were made at the DDP, D/C, or short cut in the chain of command? basic

there was an informal but understand

The WH/D history states:


\[
\sqrt{5}
\]

over the activity. Having in fact any contact whatsoever excluding J. C. King, Chief, WH/D, from A task force was formed under Blinder, at the time of the anti-Castro activity stated exactly:

plans to oust Castro, one source close to the DDP further into detail about the evolution of the covert should be devoted to this subject before going the invasion, it seems appropriate that some atten- considerable speculation ever since the close out of the Bay of Pigs Operation has been the subject of
There is nothing in the record to support this allegation.

The impact of such allegations on King's role, and the Republican Party's efforts to discredit him because he had known William D. Patterson, during the author's initial conversation with Patterson about the papers, were not apparent in the subsequent discussion of the relationships between WH/D and Patterson.

This will become most apparent in the subsequent discussion.

Also, suggested to the author that "they" wanted to understand the motives. To what extent he

J. C. King never was told, I think for

By Richard Bressett, the PP/ was stated:

Richard D. Bressett, who was chief of operations for WH/D, and by Richard Bressett, the PP/D, King's role in day of Pigs' operation have been provided by

Additional information concerning J. C. King's course of the day of Pigs' operation is

very close contact with Col. King throughout the times. It is clear, however, that Patterson was in that he was not sure what J. C. King was up to at all.

Pigs activity from this inception until the conclu-
... while the latter was in process was to the study of the Cuban operation and to the way of history on Guatemala. So an and I never was able to get much in

I think that one of the many reasons

Coordination. Assistant to the Director for Planning and
Cooperation in this capacity as Special As-
operation which was run by Richard H.
now, a very substantial parliamentary
Guatemala, there was, as everybody knows
more thinking. Except in the case of
this time at bat and report some relatively
was any time left, J. C. King would have
Europe and even Africa, then if there
and consequently, at least meetings, for
the DDP, a very front priority matter.
our other worldwide responsibilities in
in Latin America which got to be given
there was very little that ever happened
than of interest. Guatemala and then Cuba,
was "Mr. HM" by cable. With the except-
I stayed over in the same job that he had
and quite briefly... I think what had
and maybe two cables a week from the stations,
stuff on the air on the old WH WAY.
doing their thing in the old WH WAY
go over. There would be the old WH types
they were just working that out and
... and that's all about it. And I would
understand cable 18963 IM from Guatemala
Herbert, would call and say, "I just don't
a person. Then again, his deputy, Ray
and then he would be out... that's as
would retract, and then he would be in;
He was sorry to produce, and then he
... sometimes, saying that
it's therefore, from time to time, the
was in it, to what extent he was not in
different. In the course of an oral interview, the
Bissell had intimated that the situation was somewhat
pleated out of W/H activities and operations' Mr.

Where Dr. Brainard talked that J. C. King was cut com-

\[ \sqrt{9} \ldots \text{it was tough.} \]

... and it was ... it had been taken away
state -- again had been taken away
was a lot of money and all that kind of
of their big chances to shine -- there
here now for the second time running, one
they were a tight-knit little group, and
Western Hemisphere, except in Washington.

in W/H who had served outside the
within W/H, there were very few people

It was a very interesting distinction. In
term of the rotation, it was solely
but he had been at it for an awful long time.
would like to see in a distinction chair,
he had all of the area expertize that one
properly, J. C. King did. He was very vain.

\[ \frac{\text{the old man had a great deal of money}}{\text{aside and made chairman of the project}} \]

... good men, Jacob D. Barrett, is pulled
one of J. C. King's few very
and his assistant, Tracy Brown, is all
become the case officer for the thing.

-- now, however, DDP justed of SARC
no, once again the same man, Bissell
branch, and build up that branch -- oh,

... and leave this W/H project with that
hand W/H, or whatever the hell it was,
that one comes along, and rather than ex-

All right, that rankled, I am sure.

... could I take any of the bows for it.

\[ \ldots \text{luck more than anything else.} \]

... at the dump

... was a success, through dump

... when it turned out to be a success

Guatemala experience, and particularly

J. C. King. He was divested of the

that this had never set very well with
with my own. It was inconsistent with, or in conflict
with the general attitude toward the operation
mentioned. The report of the operation
was photostatic apart from the very
advice was sought and given, and
began during this operation. His
channel was brought into all the
command on the other hand, J. C.
J. C. King in the sense of a command
line and myself that didn't go through
was frequent interchange between the
operation increased, and with the passage
now, as the scope of the scale of this
all the cases going through J. C. King
not under the usual requirement of
have direct access to me. He would
of this project and direct control would
that the decision would take change
made by some such date as June [1960]
made that the decision I speak of was
that it wasn't, [but] I am reasonably
[1960]. In fact, I am pretty sure
I doubt it, it was as early as March
-- decision fairly early in the game
there was a debate on that you have heard have an element of
go to say that both of the things
mind that that was the case. I was
Mr. Blissell: There is no doubt in my

end-run,
intended and that he was deliberately
heated in both sides -- that he was
this point J. C. King's relationship to
the day of this project, I have

Question: I would like to clarify at

former DPQ responded to questions concerning J. C.
The only point of contention between King and Eisenhower was that the state of the written record bears out Rostow's assertions about the relationship between Jake and the President. Mr. Rostow: I don't remember many instances where there was a serious conflict between Jake and the President. Mr. Blazek: Just a matter of great efficiency, or you and not getting enough work done. Mr. Rostow: I think it was in part on the part of Allen Dulles -- that J. C. was not willing to do what the President wanted to do, and in part I think the feeling probably was that the President was not very fast moving, quite contrary to what I feel was the case. This kind of very fast moving, quite large scale, quite complex, paramilitary operation was not as effective as that J. C. was running on the part of Allen Dulles -- in some degree perhaps not on my own part. What precipitated that? On my part, I think the model of the Guatemalan operation, with thesein to Jake, coming directly to you and not getting through enough work done. Mr. Rostow: Just a matter of great efficiency, or you and not getting enough work done. Mr. Blazek: I think it was in part on the part of Allen Dulles -- that J. C. was not willing to do what the President wanted to do, and in part I think the feeling probably was that the President was not very fast moving, quite contrary to what I feel was the case.
What he did have to do with, ever since I have nothing to do with this project. "As you know, there times he said to me in different... instantly apologize... well, the whole thing on this part was so... life to speak to you. "Well, fine...""

Long time secretary, "Mr. Heltas would..."

I am a telephone call from Dick Heltas, and it hasn't hit the fan, and are back, and it hasn't hit the fan, and the Cubans are out, and the British, gratifying myself that the plane is out, "I am sitting there con-... Long weekend... trying to get an airplane before the..."

Following comments:

Dear Mr. Heltas, who became cops/MH/h, made the... sequentially are entered into this second in rather full... views again provided the best explanations, and,... particularly involved in the Cuban project, oral inter-... operations (cops) for the DPP -- to become more than the failure of Richard Heltas -- at that time chief of the interface of the stage of the day of the operation is another of the questions which must be addressed...
devoting himself to a lot of the other on agreement between us that he would be, that he was something of a facton. There was something of a facton out of the line of command on this opera- on, very well informed, but he was really pretty well informed as to what was going on the cable traffic and I think he was.

I think that he [Helm] saw most all

mentioned as follows:

Helm's role during the course of the day of pigs' com-

pressed in responding to the question about

around him. I don't know. If

and he didn't want to have the tar baby

I shouldn't that this thing would screw up

that Helms suggested that there was a high

good at. A less attractive suggestion is

store of course. Hems was damaged

somebody had to watch the whole worldwide

incredibly immersed in this one thing

left went on! and it [Bessel] was getting

reson may have been that of course

the thing like the plague. One of the

and that was the end of that. He accepted

Hemsa... yes. well think you very much.

could use your expertise. He said,

to cherish that you did have me

I don't want to be cautious about this, but I wish

project. I said, "Well, Mr. Helms, I don't

know I have nothing to do with this

say. The thing time that he said, "You

... to ask me the details... very apologetic...

committee meeting that afternoon, so he had

end, "He was going to the regular com-

Well, those units down in quarters by

reading the cable traffic total him

I guess he had enough to do with this

periodic report of any sensitivity.

mite that met with periodic regularity-

the French Cary Powers thing, he had
many questions raised early in the game was whether
to the nature of the anti-Castro effort. Among the
Special Group 512 and on an inter-agency basis as
Castro activity discussions were begun by both the
separate branch in WH Division to handle the anti-
stimulation with the decision to create a

us was more fact than explicit. It was
tions that the discussion of labor between
which I was that we were in that, but it really was our habit during the,
I never had that feeling at all. -- I think rather less often he would con-
my statement or conclusion from me
I think rather less often he would consult him
about something that I was handling.
We saw one another, of course, all the
time. Quite often I would consult him
handle certain kinds of matters
and I would go ahead and
matters, and I would go ahead and
handle certain kinds of

discussion of labor between us when he was my deputy.

Blessed! Let me say this was probably
and hence

this wasn't a session in which you
question. This was a fact agreement.

My time.

cause this was taking a great deal of
going business of the DDP office, be-
According to the report on the Special Group Meeting:

in the whole concept of the Bay of Pigs operation, would ultimately develop as one of the key weaknesses predicted with uncanny accuracy the situation which Eisenhower's National Security Advisor, Gordon Gray, President at this same Special Group Meeting. President

spontaneously opposition leaders to get a foothold. "13

or Castro, but rather actions designed to enable re-

stated that we do not have in mind a quick elimination
1960 that the President of Central Intelligence "empha-

It was during the Special Group Meeting of 13 January

ations concerning Cuba's role in assassination plots,

Ridet. As reported in subsequent congressional re-

Guerrera and Raul Castro, would be even worse than

Ridet Castro were deposed, perhaps his successors, the

The Department of State was concerned that it

Council.

volving either the President or the National Security

- taken by the Special Group, without necessarily in-

emphasized that contingency planning should be under-

of US military force tooust Castro. DCI Dullas

tovert implications being the ultimate application

the US program should be overt or covert, with the
Mr. Gray commented that a problem would be posed for administration officials if a decision should be taken to change our attitude toward Castro, as outlined earlier in the meeting. He acknowledged that any such decision must be kept highly secret, but he foresaw difficulties which would arise, for example, during testimony by the Secretaries of Defense and Treasury before Congress, at public gatherings, etc., if they should have to give an impression that the US was not doing anything about Cuba. 14/

This in fact, was the "damned if I do, damned if I don't" position in which Richard Nixon found himself in the Fall of 1960 and the position in which the United States found itself with reference to both the United Nations and the Organization of the American States throughout the course of the Bay of Pigs operation as the myth of "plausible deniability" overruled common sense. Following the initial Special Group meeting, there was a flurry of activity seeking some solid proposals; and in a CIA meeting of 21 January 1960, C. Tracy Barnes (the Assistant DDP for Action), J. C. King, Jake Esterline, and Dick Helms among others, discussed a whole series of issues which would be basic to the program from this time forward: identification of the principal Cuban leaders -- Ramon Barquin, Justo Carrillo, and Miro Cardona (who would eventually
Stringent Security precautions were subsequently imposed on all operations, and he would subsequently be the only person of the senator's office in attendance.

Al Cox, one of the senator's officers in parliament, noted: "That of Betancourt in Venezuela."

The more liberal Latin American governments (e.g.,

need the problem of trying to gain the support of countries also surmounted. This initial meeting also revealed

resisting money for the support of Cuban exile organization

transition of economic sanctions and as a covert means of pressure on the US government for the possible imposition

possible involvement of US businesses to put over the groups in the United States were all discussed. The US business as a cover for the operations of the exile

attract for support operations and the question of zone was discussed, and the possible acquisition of bases and for PM treatments at Port of Playa in the Canal

was raised; the training program for both communists

operating out of either Third country or US areas

head up the product anti- Castro organization sup-


SECRET
The project will be designated as JAP, except in the project became JAP, for some time in the period be-
following component of this crypt.
The crypt for the WH/HA and casto operation was

Within the next week or two, the group would receive
activities that were being undertaken, noting that
to the Special Group (3 February 1960) some of the
needs of command. "The director subsequently explained
Task force for greater security and to simplify chan-
was used in establishing WH/HA rather than the term
J.C. King told the director "that the branch concept
being initiated by WH Division, and at the same time
predicted in general terms on the planning that was
early in February of 1960, Allen Dutts was

\[ \sqrt{16} \]
The big sugar sack?

Cuba. 18\sqrt{} and the possibility coordination of activities via a-

\[\text{In addition to the Special Group, which included}\]

Randolph in Panama was given minor attention; and

Randolph in Panama was given minor attention; and

Randolph. The training program for the PM cadre at Fort

Randolph. The training program for the PM cadre at Fort

Reserve to meet any shortages. At this planning ses-

Reserve to meet any shortages. At this planning ses-

That funds would easily be obtainable from the Agency

That funds would easily be obtainable from the Agency

An estimate that would, in effect, be some 40

An estimate that would, in effect, be some 40

Ant-Castro effort might reach 3 million dollars.

Ant-Castro effort might reach 3 million dollars.

Was speculated that the "ultimate magnitude" of the

Was speculated that the "ultimate magnitude" of the

Had roughly $50,000 available for immediate use, it

Had roughly $50,000 available for immediate use, it

Ganda broadcasts, and funding. Nothing that WMDivision

Ganda broadcasts, and funding. Nothing that WMDivision

Was on sabotage of the Cuban sugar industry, pro-

Was on sabotage of the Cuban sugar industry, pro-

A.L. Cox, Dave Phillips, and Jim Planeney. The focus

A.L. Cox, Dave Phillips, and Jim Planeney. The focus

Which was attended by Tracy Barnes, J. Jack Estelline,

Which was attended by Tracy Barnes, J. Jack Estelline,

Discuss in a DDP Review Session on 11 February 1960

Discuss in a DDP Review Session on 11 February 1960

The proposals of which the DDI had spoken were

The proposals of which the DDI had spoken were

Mint.*

Mint.*

With had been interested against the Castro govern-

With had been interested against the Castro govern-

A paper outlining the Agency's thoughts on the programs