...discussed subsequently in this volume, see pp. 222-226. This refers to the Lloyd Free Report, which is...

The Group was as follows:

Recommendation that the DCI make to the Special

make result leading to Castro's ouster. 21 The

might also be stimulated to sabotage with the ultimatum of to the Special Group that has been suggested
supervision programs. 22 It was further suggested

continuation of popular domestic and hemispheric

government was dependent on sugar revenues for both the Special Group, again emphasized that the Castro

agendas for the 17 February 1960 meeting of the Special Group, and the agenda for the 12 February 1960,

ephasis on possible paramilitary action, was given

very similar briefing, with somewhat more

re-think the whole anti-Castro effort. 19 Could have (and should have) caused CIA planners to

for an attitudinal survey of Cuban society which

here, too, the seeds were planted by Tracy Barnes

DATE 1/17/60
that the loss of sugar revenues would impact on
about the sugar sabotage plan, reportedly doubting
President Eisenhower was less than enthusiastic

dent's reaction.

Gordon Gray, so that the latter could get the Pres.
Gordon Gray, so that the latter could get the Pres.
to present the plan to the Secretary of State and to
Mr. Douglas were all for the plan, and the group agreed
noted that he and the Deputy Secretary of Defense,

Mr. Irwin (assistant secret-

ory) of Defense for International Security Affairs

Special Group approved. Mr. Irwin was looking for a

engage in action, only that he was looking for a

pretexted that he was not asking for permission to

the sugar sabotage plan to the Special Group. He em-

On 17 February 1960 when Allen Dulles presented

made to the Special Group.

Planning, apparently no mention of the subject was

Interestingly enough, although the briefing for

From the 1960 sugar crop. 22

possible of the revenues anticipated
be destitute to deny Castro as much as
able and destitute, the operation of action prove feas-
should this course of action prove feas-

Cuban and American-owned sugar mills. Both
agents, for eventual sabotage of both
spotting and assessment of potential
operational planning, including covert
That CIA be authorized to intellate
the Cuban problem.

This appears to have been one of the few instances where Department of State representatives indicated their support for possible direct action programs rather than political solutions to the Cuban problem.

Later that Mr. Herter had made exactly the same point.

Mr. Joseph Scott of State also reported that on January 1960 also noted that

The minutes of the Special Group meeting of 17 Rep.

__________________________

23* 23 *

Specific approval.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.

specifically.
for the publication of Plan B de la Manina in Miami.

William Pawley, whom he asked to make arrangements with Col. King also consulted with former Ambassador

24/1 might cut back on US tourist trade with the island. US all companies deliveries to Cuba and actions which Secretary Mann also would support both cut back in sabotage of Cuban sugar mills. According to King, was in favor of both reduced sugar quotas and direct

Secretary for American Republic Affairs (who reportedly

tax for Economic Affairs) (subsequently Assistant

Col. King met with Thomas Mann, the Assistant Secre-

ance to the Agency in the past. Later in the month, had been willing and able to provide valuable assist-

and King brought to Perkint's attention that Corcoran,

ambassador HlL and Thomas ("Tommy the Cork") Corcoran,

operation. Perkint was planning meetings with the Cuban sugar

discussion concerning the distribute effects which

18 February, King and Milti Perkint had a detailed

the Special Group Meeting of 17 February 1969. On

C. King charged ahead almost immediately following

President had about the sugar sabotage activity, j.

despite the rather positive doubts that the
the infiltration of communists and communist ideology into Cuba and the United States was being endangered by the ongoing conflict between the U.S. and Cuba's friendly governments. Washington presented the agency with a copy of a proposal for implementing a plan to establish a "democratic" government in Cuba. The proposal was approved by the State Department and was presented to the agency.

Washington informed the agency that the CIA's ongoing effort was a conflict of interests and that a plan had been developed to remove "red" Castros. The plan was to remove non-ballast groups who were going to make a serious effort to remove "red" Castros. The plan was to use money that was going to be used on behalf of Mr. Huston's "high level committee." The plan was to remove Cuba's Jutzo Castillo. The plan was to make it appear that "red" Castros were helping Mr. Huston's "high level committee."
Toon effort to CIA.

custom to turn over a planned USIA anti-Castro car.

The result of the meeting with Washburn was a de-

* 

the ultimate tragedy at the Bay of Pigs, some of the

suitability of removing Prida Castro, and in light of the

removal of Jacobo Arbenz in contrast to the pos-

sidered the differences with respect to

what was being planned for Project WARE. It noted some

anti-Arbenz operation in Guatemala in light of what

The memorandum, undated and unsigned, revealed the

certain with the potential anti-Castro operations.

drafted by one of the individuals most closely con-

considered, a cautionary memorandum appeared

action, and other measures against Castro were being

exists, and as the possibilities of sabotage, PM

forward, as plans were being made for training Cuban

as the propaganda activities were being pushed

\[ \text{benefit} + 26/ \]

visit Cuba, to meet with Washburn, who was planning to

be advised about Mr. Washburn, who was planning to

The director and Mr. Benton agreed that it would

US was sympathetic to the need for change in Cuba.

into Cuba -- at the same time not denying that the
hand had eliminated the Batista influence, and Fidel could not depend on his army. Castro, on the other forces of Guatemala, and when the crisis came, he
Guatemala Arben had made no changes in the armed had surfaced in Cuba to oppose Castro; and that in character and standing, but no one of similar stature that Castillo Armas was a Guatemalan leader of high weak leader, Castro was obviously a strong leader;
specifically pointing out that where Arben was a specifically during the course of the anti-Castro activity, there were a number of circumstances which would not the memorandum also noted that believable luck. "22" generally weak", and that "we had un-
badly led, and generally weak", and that "communist support for Arben came from the local communist party, which was immature, unusually weak"; that "communist support for Arben, It was noted that the Guatemalan leadership was with reference to project MAME. able factors" with reference to Guatemala and suggested memorandum stressed "the unique coincidence of favor-- among other things, for example, the author of the thing-- even though it is not known who read the piece. Key points made in this memorandum are worth repeat--
J. f the propaganda activities, the planned use

rely US intervention in Cuban affairs. In part re-
would be a "kiss of death" for anyone who tried to
Legitimacy being purchased by Cuban exile groups,
commercia radio stations, even if the time were
ported out that the propaganda broadcast out of US

musters both Cuban and foreign. Secondly, it was
as a victim of international communism, and the Com-
should be attempting to drive a wedge between Castro,
ements in Cuba into a united front and US efforts
propaganda attacks on Castro were forthright anti-US
errors were being made. It stated that the blunt
where the writer claimed that tactical -- not strategic
The memorandum concluded by pointing to three areas

a matter of record. 28/

propaganda support from both Moscow and Peking were
Ambas government -- in Cuba, the heavy economic and
city was the nearest Soviet official available to the
\n
Moreover, the unknown author pointed
and introduced a system of intense ideological in-
the key military positions with his own followers
Quezada was director of the Federal Aviation Agency.*

...real Quezada's effort to put an end to such flights.* 30

...The agency fully supported Gen.

...the Cuban came ready by light aircraft flying out

...the Cuban had been giving to the bomb attacks on

...in part by the increasing attention which the OCB and

...in question. The memorandum may have been prompted

...it is probable that Tracy Barnes wrote the memorandum

...Guatemala activity and the nature of the criticism.

...based on the language, the familiarity with the

...these were run out of Latin America or Western Europe. 29

...moved to third countries and if fund raising activity

...could be eliminated, the propaganda activities were

...the memorandum suggested that many of these risks

...have additional ammunition to use against the US.

...it would mean that the anti-American opponents would

...that this cover would not withstand careful scrutiny.

...under study, if the author was correct in assuming

...hazardous in the eyes of the author of the memorandum

...use of US business as a funding mechanism was also

...support of the Cuban opposition, particularly the

...of US business groups as a cover for the agency's
Top Secret

- 57 -

They emphasized the need for cooperation (training and propaganda activity) in the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis. The programs that were going to be put into the meeting and outlined to the General Branch on March 1960, J.C. King and Jake Estelline presented their first official meeting as a policy on the Western Hemisphere.

During this period of evolution of national communism from the island of Cuba and, in effect, from the Western Hemisphere, the Cuban revolution under Fidel Castro, and the establishment of the national security council, and the development of the National Group, they were aware of the efforts to satisfy the goals of the anti-Castro effort were fully immersed in the anti-Castro plan. The personal involvement of President Eisenhower, formally approved thecooked a plan on January 1960, when the Director presented his views to the President.
a suitable paper for the director's presentation were
those in the agency having a direct hand in preparing
1960 (to provide to the special group evolved, among
gram which Allen Butler had agreed (on 17 February
that the previously mentioned covert anti-Castro pro-
it was during the period between 8-17 March 1960
of defense. 31
the office of special operations of the Department
other elements of the US Government, particularly with
noted that liaison channels would be established with
be called on for support. In addition, prepare also
be in contact with other elements which would
and ops officer, would be the participants who would
\[ 32 \] the Department's and do standups, his plans
PHTL Toomey, political and psychological strategy,
deputy chief, MH/4, Dave Phillips, propaganda officer,
meeting, take notes for the meeting that Bob Reynolds,
and the Office of Security. At this initial
personnel (particularly the military personnel play-
the comptroller's office, the DDS's, DPD, the PR staff,
and support from all of the offices that were repen-
considerable pressure up to various portfolios. The paper is poorly drafted and needs some revision. I think you will agree with me that

Department.

Designated representatives for the

for an oral briefing or handed to the

deriving whatever it is used by the

since I feel that this document needs re-

consideration of Cuba until next week.

After reading it, I asked Tom to defer

action program against Fidel Castro.

This afternoon the attached paper for the

Tom Parrott gave me for security late

Tom Parrott’s note to Mr. Barnes read as follows:

for, Mr. Helms’s note to Mr. Barnes read as follows:

approached the task of writing a paper for the

best illustrates the seriousness with which the Agency

from Richard Helms to C. Tracy Barnes on 8 March 1960

the development of the policy paper, perhaps a note

memorandums and drafts and other papers related to

Security Adviser. Other than the more than a dozen

items and Gordon Gray, the President’s National

ment of Defense; Admiral Burke, Chief, Naval Opera-

Secretary for International Security Affairs,

Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs,

Group Representative at this time were livid.

Those who figured most prominently among the Special

Estertine, J. C. King, and Tom Parrott, among others.

C. Tracy Barnes, Richard Blessell, Dick Helms, Jack
The constant quest for plausibility deniability would
ganization of American States and in the United Nations.
among the Latin American representatives in the Org.
not only in Latin America per se, but particularly "concerned that there be no "anti-US repercussions"
in the anti-Castro activity, there was a tremendous
Throughout the discussion of the Agency's role

\[ \sqrt{33} \]
are not induced in Latin America. \[ \sqrt{32} \] in such a manner that anti-US repercussions
states; and to cause this change to occur
that will be acceptable to the United
Cuba’s headed by Fidel Castro, with one
To replace the present government of

FOLLOWS

problem facing the US was stated rather simply as
In the paper to which Mr. Helms referred the

\[ \sqrt{542} \] group next week. \[ \sqrt{32} \] about shape for use by the Director with
that hand and advise him how to put it in suit-
May I ask that you take this matter in

you.

sense in elaborating them in this note to
There are other points, but there is no
and raises more questions than it answers.
economic action is not sufficiently precise
have in mind. Also the paragraph on covert
way, in my opinion, to describe what we
reference to a "short-wave radio station
2 and 3 needs reexamination. For example, the
feel that the backup material in paragraphs
places. I do not disagree with the listed

RELEASED PER P.L. 102-506(FK ACT)
NARA J:\DATE 4/17/97
It is also noted that for the remainder of FY 1960,
the sum of the parts shown for FY 1961 is $1.7 million,
where a typographical error, or a mistake in addi-
tion, was shown as $1.6 million, was
for fiscal 1961 which is shown as $1.6 million,
and carelessly enough, for the estimated require-
ment, was

\[ 34 \]

\[ \sqrt{1961} \]

For the remainder of FY 1960 and $1.6 million for
the Special Group Indicated the need for $900,000
for the Special Group Included in the Proposals
called a Functional Annex Included in the Proposals
for the PM cadres, or "action groups" as they were
from the Qtr of the Government of a Training Site
stage of US planning mention was made of the offer
interestingly, too, is the fact that at this early
phase of resistance groups already exist in Cuba,
cadres to provide communications and PM training
functions of the Cuban economy, including large scale
Group sessions -- anti-Castro propaganda, etc.
and those areas highlighted in previous Special
paper which Mr. Helms found somewhat lacking (emphasis)
the proposed paper for the Special Group (the
operation by Agency planners,
successfully, to be sought throughout the course of
become the essence of gristle -- constantly, and un-
As the paper was being prepared for Special Group consideration, J. C. King, chief, Western Hemisphere Division, had forwarded a memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence, providing him with additional information for use during the Special Group discussions, and the transmittal to the DCI was recorded that this paper had been used to brief Mr. Nix on 2 March 1960. King's memorandum covered much the same ground as the paper which went to the Special Group, but contained considerably more detail about the activities of the Castro Government which were directly aimed at overthrowing the legitimate governments and replacing them with Communist oriented governments. Col. King's paper also revealed that both Guatemala and Nicaragua -- the only two governments in Latin America which were to throw their full support behind the Agency's anti-Castro activity -- had made offers at this time for both radio time for anti-Castro broadcasts and, also, for training facilities for anti-Castro groups which the Agency might wish to sponsor. 35/

Despite President Eisenhower's previous objection to the over-emphasis on plans to sabotage Cuba's
Take action as necessary, including military action, to ensure the continued

Council regarding US bases stated:

was addressed to recommend to the National Security
security adviser, Gordon Gray. The policy that Gray
of considerable concern to the President; National
the question of viability of the Guantanamo base was
us business and in the protection of us lives, and
organizations. There also was interest in protecting
should the us act independently of the International
concern over the question of possible loss of prestige
states of the same situation. Again, there was great
National Security Council being geared up for discussion;
states on the anti-castro program, so too was the
Even as the Special Group was planning these

This memorandum was the following:

Another item which Col. King saw fit to include in
emphasis on distribution of that economic sector.