to US interests.

The United States should be prepared, it

must. Gray also was advised to play both sides of the

street, for which reference to the disruptive efforts of

non-communist groups, the position he was being urged

and support action with respect to them.

congress involvement in the Cuban situation

tion of American States to recognize the

influence the other members of the Organization-

\textsuperscript{38}

Every effort should be made to in-

I. I have approved the following rather innocuous actions:

approved the following rather innocuous actions:

following Council on 10 March 1960, President Eisenhower

following Gordon Gray's briefing of the National

Security Council on 10 March 1960, President Eisenhower

\sqrt{38} \textsuperscript{38}

It was agreed and appropriate to cope with the

unusually military action it is thought to take all feasible measures to thwart it,

Communist seizure of control from within

In the event of an intermittent or actual

Council on 10 March 1960 recommended that:

being encouraged to promote with the National Security

Lyce policy for Latin America which Gordon Gray was

\sqrt{37} \textsuperscript{37}

An additional aspect of the basic national sec-

\sqrt{37} \textsuperscript{37}

that are considered vital to the security

bases and base rights in Latin America

availability to the United States of
dockworkers refuse to do the unloading. Castro probably would use the Cuban Army should the
Cubans be sent to Cuba, but as he himself pointed out, his
cuban laborers to resist unloading explosives
delves also suspected that an attempt be made to in-
transit to the International Transport Union;

* In addition to the International Transport

* made the following rather unusual suggestion:

"dangerous munitions intended for Cuba and the duds
Transport Union somehow to induce to refuse to load
starters was duds, suggestion that the International
Among these
your own judgment as to adding them. \( \sqrt{35} \) possible address starters, for our Cuban paper use
you and received a somewhat strange memorandum
in Cuba. \( \sqrt{10} \) prior to the 14 March meeting, Messrs.

discuss the whole range of assets and possibilities
group had set aside a 2-hour session on 14 March to
Gordon Gray informed the President that the special

\( \sqrt{10} \) subsequent to the NSC meeting of 10 March 1960,

\( \sqrt{39} \) future. \( \sqrt{39} \)
by the Council each meeting, for the
situation in Cuba should be reviewed to

us out lines in the Guantanamo Base.
especially those involving the safety of
deal promptly with Trotsky experiment.
were should keep current plans to

2. The responsible departments and

3. The developments with regard to

\( \sqrt{39} \)
whether it should be somewhere in the Florida activity was again raised and discussed, the question sharply curtailed in the recent past. The question of location for the agency's covert broadcasting sharply curtailed in the recent past. The question Latin America -- programs which apparently had been but also through the efforts of USA's programs for through WNTL, the commercial broadcasting operation, for covert and overt propaganda activities, not only propaganda needs, even greater emphasis was urged through bulletins, paper placed heavy emphasis on the through bulletins, paper placed heavy emphasis on the but the memorandum of the meet- ing reflects a number of items worth noting. Even to the participants, the memorandum of the meet- ing for Cuba, much of the ground was already familiar with the paper entitled "General covert action plan with the paper entitled "General covert action plan for Cuban problem," and Mr. Biddle presented the members Cuban problem, and Mr. Biddle presented the members meeting of 14 March 1960 focused exclusively on the as promulgated by Gordon Gray, the Special Group

\[ \sqrt{12} \]
special group meeting as recorded by Col. J. C. King.

One additional subject of discussion at this meeting was also the subjects of discussion:

For 1962, the $900,000 for fiscal 1960 and the $1,600,000 million for $600,000 in the budget, and the question of a budget program.

The questions of economic sanctions, as estimated by Mr. Gray was particularly concerned by the military plans during this discussion than had occurred previously during the year.

Agency estimate that it appears no large scale para-

military effort (other than wholly covert) will be needed to speed up the training in the less than 6 months, and he wondered if the training effort was feasible over (other than wholly covert) will be

Feasible in less than 6 months and the worry of the

military effort was also feasible to speed up the training in less than 6 months, and the worry of the

agency estimate that it appears no large scale para-

military effort was also feasible to speed up the training in less than 6 months, and the worry of the

military effort was also feasible to speed up the training in less than 6 months, and the worry of the

agency estimate that it appears no large scale para-

military effort was also feasible to speed up the training in less than 6 months, and the worry of the

military effort was also feasible to speed up the training in less than 6 months, and the worry of the
The Agency should be responsible for broadening its contacts with such groups and attempting to unit them in a purposeful campaign. The anti-Castro groups, both within and without Cuba, should be brought to the development of the guerrilla capacity of the Central Intelligence Agency and other discussion, notwithstanding the focus of other discussions, wide enough known to be menable.

- There were enough leaders capable of taking over as far as we could see. Colonel King, who had raised the question then continued:

- Castro's government from political power. The para-

- instances.

- that assassination was not the issue in these two

- the recollection of the participants in the meetings.

- it is apparent from the

- according to alledged assassination

- only be overthrown by the use of force, were discussed.

- and the President's government will

- which is highly unlikely -- this operation can be a

- and the operation could be undertaken in one package.

- be authorized.

- that the gesture was made publicly.

- and there was therefore the

- Admiral Burke said that the only orga-
These papers also noted that parliamentary propaganda activities that were being mounted against Castro on both the political opposition to Castro and on the Barnes' evening, 14 Mar., which went into more detail. was labeled as revised version, done by C. Tracy. copies of two drafts of such a paper, one of which President, on 14 and 15 March, the records reveal into the version which would eventually go to the prepared additional backup material which could be cranked. the proposed anti-Castro operations, the Agency pre- as part of the effort to improve the paper on Eisenhower later in the week.

Eisenhower later in the meeting of the discussions and plan to present it to President that the Agency would revise the paper on the basis of the Cuban guerrilla warfare groups. At the conclusion of the 14 March meeting, it was agreed that the Agency should take the lead in assisting the Latin American governments which were skeptical of these groups to develop friendships among various of the DCI proposed that CIA should take the lead in assisting them to direct their efforts against Castro. The DCI
Allen Dulles, Gray was the recipient of a briefing of the proposed plan for covert action submitted by the National Security Council was the proper US reponse should the Cubans try to intervene or interfere with operations of the Naval base at Guantanamo Bay, including a possible takeover of the base. One of the principal concerns of the National Security Council and the National Group 5412. The National Security Council and the Joint Chiefs of Staff had been apprised at the time of the proposed covert operations plan.

On 17 March, there was an interesting bit of information presented by Dulles at the April meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The information was that the Cuban government had received a shipment of 1,800,000 pesos worth of arms from the United States. The shipment was believed to be part of a larger shipment of arms that had been planned for delivery to Cuba by the end of the month.

Dulles also discussed the possibility of a direct attack on the United States by Cuba, which was believed to be a serious threat. He indicated that the United States had been preparing for such an attack for some time and had taken steps to deter it.

It was also discussed that the United States would not allow the Cuban government to participate in a nuclear test. Dulles stated that the United States would not allow the Cuban government to participate in a nuclear test because it was a violation of international law.

The United States had also been discussing the possibility of a military intervention in Cuba. Dulles indicated that the United States had discussed the possibility of a military intervention in Cuba, but that it was not a priority at the moment.

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meet with Eisenhower's representatives, then he would
lose situation for the US. If Castro refused to
the President would personally designate
that Castro have private conversations with an emissary
relations between the two countries and suggesting
him that he was concerned over the deterioration of
D Eisenhower sent a message directly to Castro telling
"unconventional and radical" - having President
out. In addition, Beik suggested a plan which was
legislation, perhaps Castro could be straightened
reason, suggested again that with the new sugar
less than what he desired, Mr. Beik, for whatever
or direct sabotage of the Cuban sugar industry were
already indicated that proposals for economic action
castro's ouster. At a time when the President had
that had already been undertaken with regard to
staff was completely in the dark as to the planning
Mr. Beik, even though he was a member of the NSC
situation at Guantanamo Bay. It appears as though
of 17 March which again focused exclusively on the
for the planned National Security Council meeting
note from a member of his own staff, Samuel E. Beik,
... where Castro's position and prestige stood that the effort will be to under-
most of what must be done. He under-
or those people, getting Cuba to do
contacts with the groups involved to two
It. He said we should limit American
pared to swear that he has not heard of
breach of security. Everyone must be pre-
better plan for dealing with this situa-
The President said that he knows of no

Report on the meeting:

General A. J. Goodpasture. Based on General Goodpasture's
Colonel King, Gordon Gray, Major John Diggeshowwer, and
son, Secretary Irvinn, Admiral Burke, Richard Blessitt,
merchant, Mr. Ruhmton, Secretary of Treasury Under
dent were Vice President Nixon, Secretary Herter, Mr.
ent were the President's Group. In attendance with the Pres-
of the National Security Council and the practically
sent he covered action plan to a combined meeting
at 1430 hours on 17 March 1960. Mr. Dutts pre-

Mr. Gray:

M. B. Belews suggestions apparently never went beyond
between the US and Cuba probably would be impovred.

with the President's representatives then discussions
the UN for its efforts. If Castro did agree to meet
other hand would receive the blessings of the OAS and
be condemned throughout Latin America. The US on the
vested by US firms in Cuba, terminating private
might be taken to cut off the flow of new capital in-
business interests in Cuba, and suggested that steps
Nixon, too, indicated some concern with the American
ever, but him rather shoot on this. Vice President
these private property rights. Vice President, how-
and he was pushing for US intervention to protect
welfare of the US firms which had investments in Cuba.
the Treasury Anderson exhibited great concern over the
during the course of this meeting, Secretary of

\[ \sqrt{48} \]
us. job is to get the US to support
and out of the OAS. . . . Essentially,
should be working on what we can do in
that has been done. In the meantime, what
our hand should not show in anything
what actions are we to take. He said.

---

action
people in Cuba we would be obligated to take
we the Cubans were to start to attack our
let the Latin American countries know that
like some groundwork laid with the OAS to
these . . . the President said he would
the operations. He and the other
All Industry Cuban reactions and prepare the
agents involved should take account of
the President told Mr. Dulles he thought
the President told Mr. Dulles he thought
22 March 1960, p. 3 

Support for covert military operations on the island.

- Force outside Cuba, with the necessary logistic support.
- Within Cuba, and the development of a paramilitary organization.
- A network of intelligence collection and perception of anti-Castro elements, provision for a powerful propaganda network.
- An anti-Castro offensive against the island, perceptive action of opposition forces around the island would be the focal point for all of the communist enemy political opposition located outside.
- Thus set US policy. Briefly restated, the Four Major 1960 covert action program against the Castro regime

President Eisenhower's approval of the 17 March 1960.

JSM. 4/16/60

Businesses already there, and reducing American tourism.
By author. 5/1 orphaned statement deleted on 17 March 1960. "Emphasis added."
The policy paper approved by the President contains the paragraph 2d of the governing paramilitary action that states:

The only approved, written policy that states:

"operations for Project WMD that:

Correctly noted in his memorandum for record of PM, Colonel Jack Hawkins (USMC) who was Chief, WPS, MW, the approved plan.

Fundamentally, with reference to the approved technicals, the invasion, the paramilitary activity was clearly to be in the context of guerrilla warfare with leader--ship and training to the dissident activities inside Cuba. The paramilitary activity was clearly to be for covered action by the Agency Is there any hint of that no point in this Presidentially-approved plan.

Tactically, many of one or more active centers of resistance will be trained at secure locations outside of the US so as to be available for a second phase, a number of paramilitary instructors, in turn recruited after careful screening and initial training, attack old leaders will be.

Thus, to the paramilitary operation:

Note the language of the approved policy with reference to the subsequent memo made in the cover act plan to which it is particularly important in light of changes which..."
ante, continued on following page

and the methods which are best calculated to achieve the need to reverse the trend in Cuba. Therefore, the suggestion of the Navy of our people to form a merchant marine, noting "a marked decrease of thirty per cent in shipyard and shipbuilding on March 1960, merchant repatriation levels and were already familiar to both Secretaries of Defense and to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Mr. W. J. Leary, who had just assumed that post. A serious of recommendations covering the same grounds -- propaganda, organization, and political action by the State Department, etc. -- was presented to the Western Hemisphere Affairs Board, which resulted in a report to the Assistant Secretary for Defense. A copy of this report is also given in Appendix B. The reader is also referred to Appendix C for a set of correspondence between the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Burch, and the Assistant Secretary of the Navy. The reader is also referred to Appendix D for a set of correspondence between the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Burch, and the Undersecretary of the Navy, Senator John F. Kennedy. The reader is also referred to Appendix E for a set of correspondence between the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Burch, and the Undersecretary of the Navy. The reader is also referred to Appendix F for a set of correspondence between the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Burch, and the Undersecretary of the Navy.

Appendix B, page 300.

Appendix C, page 311.

Appendix D, page 300.

Appendix E, page 300.

Appendix F, page 300.

...
Dear Allen,

Attn: Burke

Any be of interest to you. Sincerely yours,

To the Director of Central Intelligence

Embrodoured is a memorandum

Dear Gordon: Enclosed is my copy of a

Advisor Gray he wrote:

two important are interesting. To National Security
Burke's communis on the transmittal. She gave to these
for National Security Affairs, and to Allen W. Dulles.
Gordon Gray, the Special Assistant to the President
another set of proposals for us. Action in China to both
more than any other U.S. agencies. Should be properly
Buiken in which he speaks of the other
whether the response did not satisfy Admiral

This result. "Merchant then went on to review the

With reference to his action of 17 March 1960,
There was no possibility that Mr. Secretary would return to his homeland, more specifically to the possible French Army. When they might CID, a fact that had made no move the return to their home, the more specific the CID's E. German agency. After my return from Puerto Rico, I

on March 17, 1960, less than two weeks

had just received on the afternoon of 17 March, Admiral Burke sent this over to the

have.

pass it to you for any value it may not believe it requires a reply, but and the letter handed (it) to me. I do
instance of such that I can recall. I am not sure what your instructions and this is the only thing that was not my practice to violate. I believe I need not assume you had any particular instructions about not making such notes. I sort of rationalized my position that I was sort of rationalized to make of disposition you wished to make of the documents in your own hands for what other copies made and by whom. I intended to put them in your hands at the place they were in. The copies might wish to have them destroyed. They were in the understanding of course, appropriately late. I intended to put them in your hands at the time they were in. The copies might wish to have them destroyed. By the way, I never received any copies of the memoranda you referred to. The next I heard about that was to make memoranda of every meeting of the special group. I had a bunch of particular subject because I had a bunch of memoranda of every meeting of the special group. I had a bunch of memos that you could recall that not so very long ago you gave me. The meeting was with Allen Dull and a meeting held to call on the former President. In preparing this comment, the former President and what he could recognize as the head of a government in exile. Stevenson, the former President and what he could recognize as the head of a government in exile. Stevenson, the former President and what he could recognize as the head of a government in exile.