the concept of the program as time passed;

to give proper consideration to possible changes in

attemting to establish project parameters and

thing to dispose of the Castro government,

for those Cubans who would be directly involved in help-

the establishment of a paramilitary training program

Agency coordination.

Agencies and, at the same time, a high level of inter-

ties and representatives of other US government

extensive coordination between Agency representa-

the acquisition of personal for WH/4 hi

The establishment of the leadership of WH/4 and

September 1960 were the following:

principal importance during the period from March to

problems of pragmatism. Among the problems of

philosophically prior to this time now had to be put

castro program. Problems which had been discussed

the problem of acting directly to implement the anti-

vously mentioned, the Agency's leadership then faced

numerous discussions, meetings, and briefings pre-
The anti-Castro program which had evolved from the

Following President Eisenhower's approval of
Requested positions to the duration of the
approved limits the usage of the
memorandum went on to state:
The various grades that had been proposed and then the
salary division of the office of personnel had approved
The same memorandum indicated that the wage and
more than offset by the decrease in the DPP complement.
The 15 new positions required by the Branch would be

Quartering stating complement:
new section within the WH division Head-
existing section, and the creation of a
transient branch, the abstraction of an
approval of the creation of a new opera-
the SSA-DDS has advised of the DPP's

(DDS) it was noted:
In a memorandum for the deputy director for support
officially got around to approving the new branch, for
until 24 March 1960 that Mr. Bessell appreciate of-
col. King in January of 1960; however, it was not
as previously noted, W/H was established by

any serious consideration.
which never should have been offered let alone given
our times during the months under study -- proposals
hated proposals that were being put forward at vast-

viableity of the operation despite numerous WLD

And, finally, to retain the creditability and
would be maintained by WH/Distleon; and that the only headquarters file on the budget for the project was the request that W/H Division to certify that the funds had been expended as specified for the project; that additionally, the OIC of his designation was also careful to point out that it would be the release of funds from the Agency Reserve, the Director in his memo to the Comptroller concerning the

are not available." 56

an unprogrammed requirement for which other funds had spread such a paper calling for the $960,000 as

Indeed the Director of the Reserve for Project MAC "55 had approved

of the paper calling for the release of $960,000 from

Jack Parrish advised me that the Director had approved

1960, the Deputy Director for Support noted that:

question of budget and finance surfaced. By 24 March

after the President's approval of the project, the

MAFF had already caused concern among those responsible

viewed for restricted purpose purposes.

in the new branch and section will be re-

Cuban crisis, after which all the positions
or the Chief, WM/Division. As approved by the Deputy Director, the project chart,

approved of the signing be given to the responsible officials for

suggested that certain WM/C in the WM/Finance Office, on the other hand, had

included in the Routing for the Directors' Memorandum.

the WM/Finance Officer. Michael King, the Director's

Memorandum placed budgetary responsibility for those items with the

WM/Finance Office. The Chief, WM/Division, Chief, WM/Division, Chief, WM/Division.

Unlike some suggestions that had been forwarded by

Unlike the establishment of the Headquarters, the training base and the communication link was to

be established with Headquarters. In this early

Medical and security officers were to be assigned to

which was to travel to Port Rondophr on 27 March.

tion of a satisfactory report from the Inspection Team

in Panama. This date was preceded by the assumption

date for the beginning of training at Port Rondophr

that I May 1960 was the target.

Further pointed out that the program had been given the crypt of JMAC, and he

called the members of WM/4 together to announce that

approval of the anti-castilo program. Take note

In the first meeting following the Presidential

specification authorized by the Deputy Director (Plans).

This financial file would be limited to persons

and may other details; and finally that access to

true, the date, those who were involved as payees,

file would be complete as to the purpose of the expend-

file...
representatives would meet once a week at least... (and) it was agreed that DDS
be taken to make all these available
and 15 April respectively. Action was
nearly all of the personnel required by
the DDS offices concerned had been mobilized
Mr. Sudan [Sudery: Geor]... that:

First meeting was that:

One interesting point made at this
meeting was that the Coral Cadets Headquarters
which later would be
staff both the Panama training activity and Base Two,

Estrella also made an appeal for personnel to

Costa Rica.

Government could be loaded either in Puerto Rico or
a part of April and that the Headquarters for such a
Government hopefully could be announced by the early
in Estrella was a key point to making the planned opera-
and stressed that the establishment of a Government
paramount importance. If the operation was to succeed,

I insist. He emphasized again that security was of
country training activities would need to be estab-

lised, that training areas in the United States, that

Fort Randsdom and Fort Sherman areas of Panama was

meeting, Estrella emphasized that training at the
Queensada, to clear with him the problems that were
was to meet with the Director of PAA, Gen. Blwadd
Aviation Administration, C. Truesey Barns (the A/DP/A)
on Swan Island were under the control of the Federal
established. Because the activities then established
someone who would conduct the propaganda effort from
- to house the transmitters and the quarters for per-
would be responsible for constructing the facilities
moreover, Phillips reported that a crew of seafarers
which were going to be installed on Swan Island,
been difficult to transport the two radio transmitters
cooperation of the United States Navy, it would have
example of this, emphasizing that without the close
other services, have Phillips provided a specific
cooperation which already was being required from
of the operation. He also indicated that the considerable degree of
the fact of agency involvement in this covert opera-
the need for security practices designed to protect
others would do throughout the course of the operation,
just mentioned, sterile the reemphasized, as he and
In another branch meeting soon after the one
\[ \sqrt{99} = 9.9 \]
port for castle, branch, prepare a report re-
of commitments, and prepare a report re-
to review activities, determine the status
are convinced that they will not enable
inhibit paramilitary actions until we
both in Cuba and abroad. We should not
sensibly understand Castro's pretensions-

Firm evidence that our propaganda and
appropriate time for kicking off any
have great effectivity in detaining the
have great effectivity in detaining the

I have the impression that our basic

that paramilitary operations, operative were as follows:

of the “picket and counter-productive aspects“ of
and recalling some

the project which resulted in the ouster of the Arbenz
operative apparatus has been associated with PBUNCESS.

from Paul Bremer, Chester, cover action, WH Division.

present memorandum was directed to Chester, WH/4
parameters for the operations against Castro, a most
as attempts were being made to establish the

defectors. 61

alerted to the need to facilitate the entry of Cubans
and the Immigration and Naturalization Service was
there be no interference with maritime activities;
with the United States Coast Guard in order that
installed. 60 Coordination also had to be effected
involved in establishing this agency activity on the
a climate prepared for the Cuban effort, and
the waters would be substantially muddied, and
critical government in the Dominican Republic,
and
tions to bring about a transition to demo-

suggested, that we were supporting efforts.

... If it became known or strongly

Latin American resolution toward the result

be accomplished by exploiting unimportant

nabled. This dossier contains no facts that will

we need to make our involvement or make our involvement

fact that will other obscure the fact

the US with responsibility for

In my opinion, castro will neutralize

and arms before the hostilities begin.

change in the interaction of personal

the leadership element with

operations must appear to be an inter-

counter propaganda, the paramilitary

actions. To avoid or minimize castro’s

every effort to conceal any

military actions, we should make

and there are any premature paga-

satisfactory from our (CA) point of view.

attitudes toward the Castro regime are

very local and foreign sympathetic and sup-

castro to recover lost prestige and

FOR SECRET
meeting of support elements every Thursday morning. "64"

Also, by way of keeping informed about developments

The progress report should generally

indicate that:

In discussing the contents of such reports, it was

that the need for crash-type responses or actions.

prepare daily progress reports as one way of enhancing

About the same time that Opre, an 66

appearance was made to Mr. Opre's proposals.

was going forward, the DDP was calling for WH to

In order to provide stories for propaganda use, ac-

that very special operations were being carried out

Swan Island was scheduled to begin on 17 May 1960 and

was informed that broadcasting activity from

Media, Mr. Blissell's Deputy, Mr. Heims (C/OPS), and 67

attendance in addition to the DC were: Gen. Cabel;

approved by President Eisenhower in mid-March. In

In mid-April of 1960 WH made the first prese...
No. 1 to the project was submitted to the Director was made quite clear within a few days when Amendment

The meaning of Chief/WH's comments to the DCI,

support of JMAR. 66

arrange to obtain personal required in the overseas or in the US, he would

assured all, no matter whether personal needs, he

With respect to personal needs, he

was the DCI's comment that:

Most important in connection with this project,

Controller for Resolution. 65

that matter would be discussed with the

It was reemphasized, the DCI was advised that

manufacturing stock supply after the project

unproductive to was not returned to com-

as direct costs only if property was found

that charges, if any, should be reflected

and based without cost to the project, and

should be held on a Memorandum Receipt

opinion of all concerned that such property

the project, was the major cause of the

which, in fact, was the major cause of the

were] being charged against the project

Direct costs of nonexpandable equipment

Escalating, particularly because:

DCI and the DCI that budget estimates were rapidly

of the ground. Further, it was pointed out to the

still remained to be done to get these activities

on paramilitary activity indicated that much work

exit and the buildup of the stay-behind network and

The reports on the evolution of the government in

on propaganda, excellent results were being obtained.
The document contains a mix of text and handwritten notes. It appears to be discussing a military or defense-related matter, mentioning names such as "Army: Gen. White, COS/VAP; and Gen. Wooloughan, Repe.
Burke; CONA, General Driskine, Chief, Special Ops, U.S. Navy. Comman
dant, N.S. Marines; Admiral Gates, Secretary of Defense; Gen. Twining, Chairman, Defense Particpants were Thomas * 

The text is not completely legible due to the handwriting and formatting. It seems to discuss topics related to military operations, defense strategies, and possibly budget allocations or requests for approval of certain funds. The document mentions various military officials and departments, indicating a high-level discussion of defense matters. The handwriting and the quality of the image make it challenging to transcribe accurately.
In the course of the discussion which followed the briefing, Admiral Burke emerged as the principal "hawk," indicating his willingness to move fleet units into the Port au Prince, Haiti area because the suggestion had been made that if Castro went into the Dominican Republic it would only be a few days time before he also would be welcomed into Haiti. In addition, Burke made it quite clear that should the Dominican Republic be invaded by the US Marines in the Port au Prince area, he would not move units to help fight this aggression. It appeared that Castro might move into the Dominican Republic if Trujillo were ousted, there was a strong possibility that Castro might move into the Dominican Republic, and where he probably would be received as a conquering hero.

J. C. King, apparently Jake Estefline, the man who had the monkey on his back as project chief sat quietly by. The suggestion which had been made by Paul Oberst that the "waters be muddled" by making it appear that the US was backing the anti-Trujillo forces in the Dominican Republic was not introduced during the course of this briefing of the JCS, even though the Dominican Republic was included as a part of the overall briefing. What did emerge with reference to the Dominican Republic was a consensus that if Trujillo were ousted, there was a strong possibility that Castro might move into the Dominican Republic.
SECRET

This briefing for the Senator personnel in the Depart-

of State had approved, in principle, the Agency's

before the end of April 1960, the Joint Chiefs

for the PM instructor cadre.

necessary to improve port facilities as a training site

procurement of materials, and hire of native labor as

was to be used for necessary construction, renovation,

This money, of course, as a working fund for the

of logistics to the Commander, US Army, ostensibly

$150,000 was to be furnished from the CIA's director

For the end of April 1960. On 19 April, for example,

in WM/4's relations with the military services be-

the JCS or not, there was a noticeable improvement

whether a direct result of this briefing or

option, the Navy had adequate force available to do

Navy was prepared to defend that base. In Burke's

Cuban government launch an attack on Guantanamo, the
Power was shot down over the USSR on 1 May 1960.

and Research.

Botty was a career minister and former ambassador.

Extraneous and Preventive Agency (AEP) to Ceylon, who

was at this time assigned to the Bureau of Intelligence

work with the covert Limited Warfare Committee of

the Army. The Agency representatives also began to

In April of 1960, in addition to working with

used for the weekend of 20 April 1 of May of 1960.

The flight, incidentally, was tentatively scheduled.

Emergency.

properly prepared to respond to any

so that the Department would be

inform Ambassador Botry before each

and that Col. Benson (USAF/operations)

throughout the entirety of the mission, but insisted that extremely

that the Department had approved the

Ambassador Botry had called to say

recorded that:

Francis Cary power's...U-2 in the Soviet Union, it was

presumably by the U-2, attacked the shutdown of

through the authority and plan for these overflights,

Taken up, not only with the Air Force, but also with

offshore Cuba. The decision on this matter was

request for overflight photo coverage of the islands
the discussion re LST’s seems highly out of place.
troops back into their Homelands and, consequently,
sions concerning the movement of a large body of Cuban
April 21 1960 discussions were being held concerning
It is rather strange that at this early date in

In addition to the requested overhead recogniz-

\[ \sqrt{73} \]

\[ \text{discussed among other interesting subjects:} \]

\[ \text{Covered limited warfare} \]
\[ \text{Committee, and} \]
\[ \text{and a Col. Anderson (NSW) who were members of the} \]
\[ \text{Navy and} \]
\[ \text{Maritime Branch with a Captain Thomas (USN) and} \]
\[ \text{Secretary of Transportation Committees.} \]

\[ \text{time concerned only to} \]
\[ \text{and the interruption of communications ex-} \]

\[ \text{tion which might be necessary to} \]
\[ \text{tion which might be necessary to} \]

\[ \text{was that of cover such transports in} \]
\[ \text{States. One of the particular problems of concern in} \]

\[ \text{the Office of Special Operations, Department of} \]

\[ \text{TOP SECRET} \]
was there any evidence awareness of the various overt
presidential's approved plan for covert action. No
CIA, State, and Department of Defense, and of the
CIA's State, and Department of Defense, and of the
cia's State, and Department of Defense, and of the
cuba, from the tenor of the paper itself, it seems
before the Special Group, of the discussions among
as though Rubottom was ignorant of the Cuban issues
was the only person of the paper itself, it seems
cuba. From the tenor of the paper itself, it seems
provided a check list of current operations and ten
cuban operations. provided a check list of current operations and ten
was the originator of an elaborate memorandum which
secretary of state for American Republic Affairs,
was the originator of an elaborate memorandum which
on 25 March, for example, Roy Rubottom, assistant
on 25 March, for example, Roy Rubottom, assistant
flow of information on cuba's internal developments.
flow of information on cuba's internal developments.
-- making elaboration plans for Cuban activities that the
-- making elaboration plans for Cuban activities that the
secretary of state seemed to be operating in a world of lies at least
secretary of state seemed to be operating in a world of lies at least
announcement of the anti-Castro policy, the Department
announcement of the anti-Castro policy, the Department
in the weeks immediately following Eisenhower's
in the weeks immediately following Eisenhower's

and vehicles. 7/4
and vehicles. 7/4

the use of lst's for beaching and landing of troops
the use of lst's for beaching and landing of troops
order to update information suitable for planning
order to update information suitable for planning
was ascertained that much work needed to be done in
was ascertained that much work needed to be done in
senate's of the navy's hydrographic office. It
senate's of the navy's hydrographic office. It
gradient problems with the marine corps and reper-
gradient problems with the marine corps and reper-
maritime branch representatives also discussed beach