Further, there is a special activity, the so-called Gray Group, which I have vis-à-vis M.R. Malloy. In addition, there is the LTV merchant, the Defense Merchant, has set up two groups, one under the chairmanship of Mr. Tully.

Gray also speculated some of the problems which would face a Cuban activity. Noting:

"77/27"

needed decisions were made when needed. M.R. Tully was a mess and that all titles of various groups were in harness and that all would take steps to assure that all of the activity to be consistently served of the Cuban problem and find someone in the Department — Dillon himself. On Douglas Dillon, the Undersecretary of State, to for by the end of April 1960, Gordon Gray was calling the Cuban plan apparently had some impact, Ambassador to Cuba, 76/ announcing the reapportionment of Philip Bonsal as US.

ment failed to consult with the Agency prior to the special group has disapproved that the department.

About this same time, Allen Dulles made known to programs with reference to the Cuban problem. 75/
revealed in the records. Presumably both elements
would basically be carried out by the agency is not
should take over the direction of a program which
whether it was simply opposition to the idea that State
program was in itself distasteful to the agency or
become chief of staff for the nation's anti-Castro
whether resistance to the suggestion that Dillon

view. 79

be adequate to support their point of
edly what we are already doing in the
barnes believes that a short paper setting
and head off this new development. Mr.
state on Monday afternoon [2 May 1960]
therefore, plan to go over to
this arrangement. Mr. Barnes and the
the agency would not look with favor on

Reference to Dillon:

W/H prepared a memorandum stating in part with
a meeting of the special group on 28 April, Chief,
the agency, and after the matter had been surfaced at
programs with reference to Cuba or states with
made chief of staff responsible for coordinating the
The suggestion that Undersecretary Douglas Dillon be

many interests. 78

The defense department, of course, has
for liaison with Bob in this matter.
be familiar. Allen Dullas has a part on
Anderson, who was in charge of the chairmanship of Bob

for secret
...activities in Cuba. That the WH Division noted in its report on the same time that Chief WH was expressing concern about
the PFI liaison officer, Sam Papich, and asked that the CI staff get in touch with the WH. It suggested that the CI staff get in touch with
relations between the US and Cuba were broken. Chief, and Cubans -- to be activated in case diplomatic
installing a stay-behind network -- using Mexicans --
WM/4 revealed that the PFI was reportedly had plans for
operations overseas, but in mid-June 1960, Chief,
PFI was prohibited from engaging in intelligence
CIA-PFI contacts concerning Cuba. Technically the
facts at this time, mention should be made of the
agreements with which CIA maintained liaison and con-
Although it was not included on the list of
the nation's Cuban program.

MR. Dillon did not become Chief of Staff for
But whatever the explanation made (see Appendix D.).
should be "soft-pedaled." He did say, however, that
point out that he thought the jurisdictional issue
that be remanded non-committal at this time, but did
before the NSC for consideration. Col. King reported
jurisdiction and that perhaps this should be brought
Gray and Mr. Malloy that the FBI was exceeding its
mental meetings in State, it was suggested by Mr.
during the course of one of the weekly interdepart-
Chief, WH division went even further when,
scion of operations to the section.
Geo. Information, on occasion, the bureau had even
operation on occasion, the bureau's operations were
individuals who had come into the FBI offices to vol-
"in or actually undertake, the deploring of various
freqently the section was called on to particpate
both the bureau and to the section pointing out that
part of contacts in the Cuban area were a benefit to
Col. King's memo also stated the bureau's long-
181
section's operations. It is either not considered with the
interested in the operations of the FBI have neither
that the operations of the FBI bureau
and the Havana office of the bureau
of the relations between the Havana station
A thorough investigation has been made

Intelligence that:

a memorandum for the acting director of central in-

...
stood the best chance of success was to turn to the problem and the one that Cuban exiles. He thought the only solution to the overthrow of the Castro regime using not completely impossible, he brought about that it would be virtually impossible. If told me that his personal opinion was according to the report from Mathem, an FBI agent sentattle with whom he was exchanging information. made a rather interesting forecast to the CIA reporting a report from one of another US Agency, an FBI agent Castro, or who were trying desperately to get sup port was under suspicion of working for the number of the Cuban exiles in the Mathem area who 

(later "WMWAD") in Mathem. In one report concerning activities at the forward operations base, JMSH even closer, particularly in the area by mid-summer 1960, the relationship became protest against the FBI's activities in the Havana the anti-Castro operation even more associated with the FBI. King, nor anyone else involved in whether Col. King, or anyone else involved in 

live in raising the question. 82 also recommended that the Agency not take the initiative particular bureau activity ever be raised. King being held in the other should question about this the memorandum he had prepared on this subject was
A series of some 32 reports has been prepared on
an organization engaged in classified research.
Records Management Officer of WH Division. These
reports, and the reports are available through the

Footnote continued on following page.

Organizations A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, and I, National Office for
the base, Guatemalan and NGER. The cover story for the base,
luxembourg and NGER, and ultimately the common
operations -- was established and ultimately the common
intelligence concerning the operations in the Provost Keys was notified
relating to the headquarters and the field -- including

The satellite communication center for relay
divisions, not to take up until a couple of
PM units. For the purposes, directly to the
headquarters, with RI, CI, CA, Support, and
established the satellite communications center for
in general, the main goal was to integrate the
operation. In 1954, in general, the main goal was to integrate
the operation. In 1953-54, the main goal was to integrate
the operation. In 1960, in Coral Gables, Florida, and it was the second

The Forward Operations Base (FBO) opened in May

*  

(interests to PBI Interests.

PBI any information which the agency might acquire
live. In turn, agreed to pass on to Mr. Davis in the
week to compare notes, and the CIA filed representatives
that they visit the PBI offices once or twice each

by accepting the agency's representative's proposal

interested in full cooperation with the agency "quick-

Agent George Davis apparently was extremely

√ 83

with him. A good point. I could not help agree
and contact with the cabin exterior, he had
but he felt that in view of his experience
that this was only his personal opinion,

go in with the US Marines. He admitted
In the Latin American world for pro-communist sympathizers, in addition, emphasis was given to the

The situation in the Soviet Union, Red China, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany, and the play that Castro was making of Cuba by personnel from communist countries (including the Castro government that was being built in Cuba) was prepared for the propaganda plan, penetration and espionage. The paper touching on the principal aspects of the

On 23 July 1960, WH/4 prepared a detailed Cuban brief.

The situation in the Dominican Republic, the Democratic nominee, John F. Kennedy, was being prepared for Mr. Dulles, and the

The situation in the Dominican Republic, the Democratic nominee, John F. Kennedy, was being prepared for Mr. Dulles, and the

The situation in the Dominican Republic, the Democratic nominee, John F. Kennedy, was being prepared for Mr. Dulles, and the

The situation in the Dominican Republic, the Democratic nominee, John F. Kennedy, was being prepared for Mr. Dulles, and the

In addition to its concern with the interests
planned program for paramilitary training and operations under the aegis of CIA. Insofar as can be determined, however, there is no indication that in his pre-election briefing of the Democratic Presidential candidates that Mr. Dulles went into any specifics on the Agency's anti-Castro plans. 85/

As mentioned previously, one of the continuing problems requiring coordination within the Executive Branch was the increasing budget demands for Project JMATE. From an estimate of some $2.5 million of budgeted and reserve funds, which had been made available for the program by mid-August of 1960, Mr. Bissell appeared at a special Group meeting, requesting that an additional $10.75 million be released from reserve funds to meet the ever-increasing needs, particularly for the paramilitary and propaganda programs. The decision of the Special Group following Mr. Bissell's appeal was that:

This matter should be laid before the appropriate higher authorities and a presentation would be arranged hopefully within the next ten days. This was believed to be wise, not because any actions involving major political risks were to be taken in the near future, but because the Agency would soon become committed to various substantial expenditures which
should not be undertaken without a reason-
able assurance that the operation was to
go forward. \(86/\)

On 22-23 August of 1960, after discussions with Mr.
Stans and Mr. Macy, the Agency was notified that the
requested $10 million for FY 61 would be made avail-
able from the Agency Reserve for Contingencies.* \(87/\)

C. Cooperation and Challenge

As already mentioned, immediately following
the Eisenhower decision to promote the anti-Castro
program, there was a considerable degree of cooper-
tion between CIA and other of the concerned Agencies
-- the Department of Defense, the Department of State,
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Immigration and
Naturalization Service, and others. As WH/4 continued
to expand and develop the various programs -- propa-
ganda, covert action, staybehind networks, and para-
military operations -- there were ever increasing
contacts between CIA and the representatives of other

* One explanation for the sharply increasing demand
for reserve funds may lie in the fact that materiel
was being written off upon issue, rather than upon
consumption -- an aspect of the operation that was
explained to the author by William E. Eisemann,
formerly Chief, Support WH/4. \(88/\)
government agencies. Perhaps the best way to describe the period from the summer of 1960 until the early fall as a period of cooperation and challenge. The National Policy -- proposals which concerned the CIA's proposals for the location of training sites, the size and make-up of the exile military force which was being organized, the nature of the propaganda effort, the size and make-up of the media effort, the size and make-up of the training cadre at Fort Randolph, and the specific material (including aircraft) being requested, and, most important by the end of this period, the specific nature of the military operation which was to be mounted against Fidel Castro.

By early June 1960, the program for paramilitary training of Cuban exiles was jumped from some 60 to 500 or more trainees -- even though the actual training facilities in Panama had not yet begun and the FPR was only in the initial stages of negotiation for PM and commo training. It was anticipated that the increased number of PM trainees would be recruited out of the Miami area, from other Latin American countries where Cubans had taken up residence.
opposition at that time "pose a serious threat to Leader to the Castro regime had emerged, nor did the
the NID also mentioned that no strong opposition
question of whether Castro himself was a Communist.
estimates, this particular NID was unable to answer
ment under his [Castro's] regime. As was past
ministers...no longer any prospect of democratic govern-
regime was "deeply and increasingly influenced by Com-
situation in Cuba," for example noted that the Castro
in Cuba. In NID written in mid-June 1960 on "The
and the increasing strength of the Communist Party
trained importation of Soviet weapons and techniques
in the number of PM trainees was related to the con-
It must be presumed that the call for increases

arms packs. 89

weapons mix in the Agency, stockpile of standard
.45 cal automatic pistol. This, of course, was the
Field rifles, the Thompson sub-machine gun, and the
were with the M-1 carbine, the Garand and spring-
be on weapons, demolitions, sabotage, and guerrilla
The emphasis on the PM training at this time was to
and from others who might be recruited inside Cuba.
THE PRD TO OPERATE FROM HIS COUNTRY. MR. DULLAS
COUNTERACTIONS OF PRESENT DICTATOR OF GUATEMALA TO PERMIT
been established in Mexico City. In view of the lust
of purges, nothing that the Headquartes for the PRD and its PRP
concerning the organization of the PRD and its PRP
Castro program, Mr. Dullas provided some specifics
developments since the March announcement of the anti-
National Security Adviser, Gordon Gray, summarized
by the DCI and Mr. Blissell. After President Eisenhower's
son, 
and 
additional persons, Lemnitzer, and Goodpasteur
dent Eisenhower, Secretaries Gates, Dillon, and ander-
treaties surfaced in a late August briefing for President
The question of an increased number of PM

\[
\sqrt{90} \text{ capability to overcome the Castro militia.}
\]

disdained leader to the fore, or (b) develop the
PM personnel might (a) assist in bringing a strong
going reasons, perhaps, an increase in the number of
in conventional operations. "For either of the 

If any, effectiveness as an organized combat force,
part poorly trained ... [and] appears to have little,
accredited as "only partially armed," and for the most
estimate concerned the Castro militia which was char-
the regime. "the weakness touched on by the National
the issue of the force level and make-up be resolved

matter over. Mr. Gray seemed to be determined that
custom until the Agency and the JCS could talk the
forces. Mr. Bullis proposed withholding this dis-
agreement of opinion during the course of this
came to "show" a recommendation that provoked some
with a leadership component to the Cubans whom "push"
adequate training in guerrilla warfare to pro-
need for a standby force, preferably of non-Americans,

bills did stress, however, that there was

guerrilla warfare effort.

not as cadre leaders for either an invasion or a

third country's would be used only as instructors.

Mr. Bullis responded that US military personnel in
directly in the military operations inside Cuba.

it quite clear that he was concerned about the pos-

program of defense representation. Mr. Gates' made
when the discussion turned to the PM forces, the de-

that the US presence in Guatemala not be revealed.

neced that at this time, it was particularly impor-

T"
means of the major powers. 2/2
Small nations would be encouraged to undertake harrass-
with Cuba, there was an obvious danger that other
at that time that it the US failed to deal firmly
summer of 1960 -- a degree of foresight with which
in the third countries, Gordon Gray displayed -- in the
states and other of the major world powers with the

* In light of today’s relations between the United

$25 million might be a small price to pay.
freed the Cubans from this troubles,
comers and that it we could be sure of
read this kind of action again and
[The $20 million increase noted
He wouldn’t care much about this kind of
have a good chance of being successful.
chases, defence, state, and CIA think we
He would go along so long as the Joint

that
side help, the President was reported to have indicated
would be able to carry off the effort without any out-
to Mr. Blissell’s view that perhaps the Cuban PM force
In support of Mr. Gray and in some contradiction

defended. * 91
against urged that a decision on this be
this stage in the planning. Mr. Blutis
consideration should be given to it at
ultimate success, all
were though that it the backup force
be worse than no effort at all. He there-
without the determination to see it
unwise to mount any kind of an operation
Mr. Gray pointed out that it would be

at this particular time. According to his own report

RELEASED PER P.L.102-526(FOK.ACT)
NARA ) DATE (6/17/05)
Powers, 96

Time for a brief discussion related to Francis Gary Powers. 96

It is also interesting to note that this off-the-record meeting which was arranged by Gordon Gray was held.

The makers about the details of the anti-Castro program, they were responsible for informing the nation's policy. Yet, the exact details from the White House, who, high ranks within the intelligence were not mentioned. CIA's senior, was ист. Illustration of the President's decision, he was discussed with no CIA representatives from Washington.

On 18 August, the attendance of the Secretary of the President was at the meeting, or the third CIA meeting, according to Gray's records, how-ever, neither the Vice President nor the third CIA ever noted that the Vice President had been invited to attend. The CIA had only been invited to attend, and the CIA had only been invited to attend.

In this memorandum of a meeting with the President, activity in his capacity as Assistant Secretary for the prior discussions concerning the anti-Castro program had already been involved in some of these matters. The Assistant Secretary of State for American Republics, principally from Thomas Mann, who soon was to become one of the most persistent problems which was never before we were ready for it. *
The precise nature of these 'serious repercussions'—

about serious repercussions, therefore, could bring

of either activity, therefor, could bring

stepped up day by day. A drastic rescheduling

the board propaganda activities are being

in Guatemala and El Salvador, our across-

with ground, and communications, training

well in excess of 200 people engaged in

activity. As of this moment, they have been

insulted to cease and desist from further

infiltration. If MR. Mann had pose a monumental

military in MRAC would pose a monumental

The degree to which we are already com-

blunt Mr. Mann's efforts, nothing for example:

WH/4 however, was that an attempt should be made to

the question seemed in order. The reaction of chief,

the US to organizing the distrust within Cuba,

press both in developing any great cohesion within

action. At this time and in view of the lack of prog-

and rescheduling of the timetable for the JAWFR oper-

that re-evaluation, he would ask for immediate review

basic concept of JAWFR, or, if it did not ask for

that MR. Mann was going to ask for a resudy of the

Economic Affairs. In early September of 1960, chief,
Fortunately for the continuation of Project D-240.

* * * 

As much as they might be able to demonstrate, the problem was the degree of strength and effect of the insurgents in the island was unquestionable.

That the insurrectionary effort was not expected. That the receptiveness of the Cuban population to a post-drops would in any way influence Mann's opinion about just how one -- or even more -- successful at

\[ \sqrt{97} \]

alleged new attitude. Mann's

heavily on assistant secretary where

full action in this area should work

return to the United States. ... success

country, prior to the assistant secretary's

least one supply and drop into the target

we are banding every effort to get at

To strengthen our position, therefore,

Man's proposals were that:

A suggestion which was made to counter the possibility

we were willing to support an insurrection agent's case.

speculated that Mann did not believe that the Cubans

democratic Latin American republics. Take Essterline

mean that the U.S. would lose face in the eyes of the

task of ousting Fidel Castro. Thus, in turn, would

charge that the United States feared to undertake the

cubans back into the exile community; and they would
history, all operations. The Secretary of State, under the terms of the treaty, was not recovered. See Volume I of this

and the armed forces made a forced landing in the hands of Castro's forces; guerrillas fell into the hands of the Cubans, forces, and total bust, the supplies being dropped to the

the question of maintaining the training base in

the US. Mano perished, however, suggesting that
should take place in third countries, rather than in

group and the "highest levels" that such training
out that it had been the decision for the Special
security and for efficiency. But they also pointed
exists take place in US bases, both for purposes of

would much prefer that the training of the Cuban
Latin American Affairs was informed by CIA that they
he raised such questions, the Assistant Secretary for
questioned the exact timing for Project W8A. As
also be pulled out of Guatemala immediately. Mano also
should all the American trainers and Cuban trainees
raise questions about the effect on Project W8A
as well as Chief, WH and others, Mano continued to
representatives including the DCI, the DIA, the DIA, Chief, WH,
in Guatemala, and in on-going meetings with agency
certain the feasibility of discontinuing the training
Mr. Mano would continue to raise questions con-

-13-
Estespur and J. C. King in their conversations with Jake

One additional point which was made by Jake

√100

to prevent or limit ultimate operations is that the US move its head at one reason and then we move to the US for one reason and then our getting ourselves into the box where that possibility should be done to avoid a
tility of the present theory or, after all, political views can still be that every-
have an interesting situation; and

The fact that a move from the present

statement be given, among other themes, to:

barnes recommended con-

a somewhat different context than has been suggested
base from Guatemala to the zone of the interior in

Terry barnes put the question of moving the

the zone of the interior have been prepared. "36"
should be made until adequate standing exist to est proviso that no move from Guatemala could or
sentiments agreed to this suggestion "Within the strict-
again with the special group. The agency's report

Guatemala or removing it to the US should be raised
any detections that tended to impede seriously the
people convinced that the Soviet Union would make up
the Communist counterattack. This was a point of some
which would not interfere with the flow of goods from
rupt the Cuban economy -- a guarantee, however,
three year guarantee period, in an attempt to dis-
leved that many was talking in terms of one to
this time however, the agency's representatives be-
which had been touched on in the early spring. At
1960, Mann also raised the issue of economic sanctions
During these discussions in the late fall of
Guatemala government, 101
would be treated as a special security force for the
Guatemala to the United States, 300 Guatemalan troops
the troop training be moved from
cated that should the troop training be moved from
in opposition to the Violators Regime. It was in-
communist elements which were already in evidence
to the overthrow of President Violators by the pro-
training program in Guatemala might very well lead
Secretary Mann was that the sudden pullout of the
Lines of the Department, seemed to have ambivalent 
the Department of State, normally one of the hard 
Douglas and Gen. Lansdale -- distinguished merchant of 
the Department of Defense representatives -- Mr. 
the United States; and although he was supported by 
posses concerning the movement of training bases to 
director for Central Intelligence put forth the pro-
In a meeting with the Special Group, the Deputy 

In southern Florida. 

be located on Vieques Island, Puerto Rico and also 
be located on Vieques Island, the maritime facilities would 
should be obtained. The maritime facilities would 
In Puerto Rico to stage block over-flight to Cuba 
and permission to use Ramo Air Force Base 
In Puerto Rico to stage block over-flight to Cuba 
and permission to use Ramo Air Force Base 
were logistical base should be located in southern 
and bomb range facilities, and maritime training and 
and bomb range facilities, and maritime training and 
artillery gunners -- field for training air and ground crews in the utitl-
range facilities, tactical training areas, an art-
training base capable of handling 3,000 men with 
part of the United States should include an Infantry 
for training bases to be located in the southern 

a memorandum for the DDP indicating that the need
Defense personnel in Project JUNAIE had been established

that policy appeared for the use of Department of

to support CIA's anti-Castro effort. It seems clear

whether the Department had actually been committed

Secretary of Defense James R. Douglas began to guess-

areas in support of Project JUNAIE. Although Deputy

back at the use of military personnel in this country

facilities in the continental United States, DoD did

In the request for the establishment of training

ment of Defense would appear to support the Agency

Although it has been indicated that the Depart-

\[ \sqrt{0.4} \] other parts of Latin America.

arms and ammunition both to Cuba and from Cuba to

the embargo be expanded to include the shipment of

favors of economic sanctions, Berle's suggestion that

also seemed to be swayed by Tom Mann's argument in

administration's principal advocates on Latin America.

\[ \sqrt{0.3} \] a Berle, who would become one of the Kennedy

treated on economic sanctions at this time.

far down the line that US efforts should be concen-

suggestions that the time for military action was so

possibly mercantile and suiting up to Mann's arguments

feelings at this time about the training program.
The problem of the President's comprehensive strategy and the dilemma of the Department of State policy.

In the conduct of foreign policy, the Department of State policy, as expressed in Volume II of this history, presented the problem of the Special Force Trainers, in some cases. The Secretary of Defense proposed the plan for a permanent, full-time, volunteer force to serve as combat troops for Project WHALE. The continued existence of the American or Foreign Volunteer Forces, the agency that was proposing the re-

The difficulties encountered with the Department of Defense concerning the assignment of Special Force Trainers from the US Army to the Guatemalan training program of covert action against Fidel Castro in

March 1960.
International agreement between the United States from claiming violations of the legal and binding restrictions, of course, was to prevent the Cubans other anti-Castro activities. The purpose of such been detected engaging in sabotage, propaganda, or used as a safe haven area for those who might have used to mount anti-Castro activities or from being and the Navy that prohibited Guantánamo from being however, there was no disagreement between the Agency of the planning that was taking place. Apparently, the day in Cuba presented an unusual situation to view once the United States Naval Base at Guantánamo the Air Force, or the United States Army, The exist-
ence encountered with the Department of Defense per se, but none of these were as serious as the difficulties
Agency encountered some problems with the US Navy, of WH/4 for the JTFPE effort against Castro, the during the period of building and organization

106 American or foreign volunteers. Prevailed, and there were no contaminants or either serve as volunteers; but in the end, State's specs for recruiting Germans, Greeks, and Turks to Collumns was particularly enthusiastic about the pros-
In addition, State desires that the Agency's liaison officer with the State Working Group on the IADB, according to Col. John P. Mallard, the
this might force Cuba's reestablishment from membership that
between Cuba and the USSR, with the expectation that
introduced asking for a determination of the relations
(NDL) where a resolution apparently was about to be
this be done through the Inter-American Defense
on of the base. One proposal had been made that
Influence Latin American nations to approve US Reten-
cuba a suggestion was put forward that the US try to
that during a meeting of the State Working Group on
surrounded in early October of 1960 when it was reported
for the Department of state, evidence of this
The Guantanamo base also presents a major dtg-
Cuban authorities. 107
there, they would be turned over to the
that if they landed
Talamo Island base was not to be used as
that all Cuban participation in over-
agreed
Bay. So serious was this issue in fact, that the
and the government of Cuba over the lease of Guantanamo