Chief PMG/DPP were "pressed" by WH/PF planners on the
Chairman claimed that he and a CO left Evans, acting
and in the initial week of September 1960, Salvation
being contemplated. During the last week of August
clues that changes in the nature of operations were
enlarge. In late August-September, there were some
operations in which the forces backed by CIA should
radical shift in the concept of the paramilitary
1960 and throughout the Fall the talk was to be a complete
prior to the Summer of 1960. By the late Summer of
of dissatisfaction with this particular type of program
and reasonably security. There had been some signs
which the anti-Castro dispositions might undertake safely
advisor for the types of guerrilla warfare activities
with a disinterested group. One trainer would be the
trained and infiltrated (or dropped) into Cuba to work
three-man units, including a communicaator, would be
was to be based on extremely small units. Two or
planning for paramilitary operations against Castro
It has already been pointed out that the initial
changing concepts

Part III
TOP SECRET

IT'S UP TO (2)

of equipment which would be required for 2-3 man units:
- dozer, and two gasoline tank trucks -- hardly type
- armored tanks, 5-1/2 ton trucks, one caterpillar
was talking about deck loading of 3 ICD's, with 5
that time, according to M. Chapman's report, M18
for the Maritime Branch of Special Operations.
At branch of M18 had spelled out some additional details
IT, Col. Began and a representative of the logistics
exercises were being contemplated. Before mid-October,
tanks would indicate that something beyond hit-and-run
reference to the use of vessels for the transport of
apparent that some changes were contemplated. The
fact to become the trainer for the PM Forces, it was
Inasmuch as Began had been requested for the proj-
tion.
ship's costs, and on the methods of their acquistion
required for troop transport, including their own
matter on the foreign cargo vessels that would be
the same branch to draft a memo to the DDP giving instor
order of the M18 staff reported they asked the M18
for which sea transport would be required. In that
approximately number of troops, tanks, and vehicles
tion had to succeed, and that if there were "losses,"
the apparent better of the group was that every opera-

was critical of the Special Group, pointing out that

in some risks -- including the risk of death. Barnes

what was needed at this time, was a willingness to

formed and tried out. Barnes was very emphatic that

let something on the order of 10-20 man teams be

blessed, suggested that rather than small team activity

was being explored. Barnes', apparently, deeming to

the Special Group, the whole gamut of options

Special Group, and in discussions within the meetings

between Agency personnel and representatives of the

cussion among Agency personnel, in the discussions

Department of Defense and the Agency. In the dis-

a program should become a joint operation between the

whether a paramilitary program under CIA could

paramilitary program. The basic question being

goint to have to be made about all aspects of the

Barnes, and Richard Blessell -- that decisions were

castro effort -- Jake Escreittie, J. C. King, Tracy

come clear to the most senior planners of the anti-

By the 1st week in November 1960, it had be-
Cuba in the conventional manner (e.g., amphibious
operation to a 3,000 man force for making a lodgment in
the board; and when the Agency tried to jump the op-
clear that the small team concept was going to go by
even as this discussion was going on, it became

\[ \sqrt{3} \]

dissident elements? resistance cumulate in the face of effective
tried by the Agency? or would the Castro
forces, if such forces were led by cadres
mitigate or his army contain the guerrilla
of the Castro forces. Could Castro's
these teams also would provide a test
supply for the anti-Castro activities.
such groups could provide guidance and
groups, once it had been established that
in Cuba were likely to rally around such
indicator whether the dissident elements
The implementation of such teams would

the smaller team activity were that:
what both Barnes and Bliss supported in terms of
pretext, to Barnes' concept of operational activity.
Contrary, com-
assault), the plan was rejected by the Special Group in a meeting of 3 November 1960. The Department of Defense supported the Agency, but State objected and suggested that perhaps the point where covert intervention was possible had passed. Gordon Gray even went so far as to raise the possibility of a fake attack on Guantanamo as a means of justifying overt US intervention. It was at this same meeting that Mr. Livingston Merchant of the Department of State raised the question of whether plans were being made to assassinate Fidel Castro, Raul Castro, and Che Guevara -- at which point General Cabell, the Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, pointed out that such activities as assassination were extremely difficult to manage and that the CIA had no capability for such an operation. 4/

Even as the size of the Cuban exile force was being debated, Headquarters cabled to Guatemala (4 November 1960) that the small team concept had gone by the board and that planning should begin for training a conventional amphibious assault force of at least 1,500 infantrymen. Outlines sent to the infantry training base in Guatemala (JMTRAV), emphasized
It was intimated that the US and possibly Allied
forces would be used to support air operations, and
port for those who had landed. An airstrip in Nicaragua
would be new recruits in the flightline to provide sup-
port of that drop. In addition, there were new recruits by air drop. "They
area, and those who joined them from within, would
create a safe area in a mountain fastness. These
cuban shores and that these men would move inland to
was that a force of 600 men would be landed by LST on
be. The concept to be presented to the President
ber, to brief President-elect John F. Kennedy on 18 November
gence and the Deputy Director for Plans were scheduled
cert were going on, the Director of Central Intelli-
even as the discussions over the changing con-

January 1961

in November 1960 and to be completed by the end of
vice. This new training program was to be instigated
through the use of scarfs, caps, or some other de-
and specific identities for the individual units;
for unit separation, competition in the military arts,
training. To do this, INTRA was urged to provide the
the need to install an expert de corps among the
governments would recognize that the force lodged in Cuba and its nominal leadership was the Provisional Government of Cuba. 8/

One strange and contradictory note which appeared during WH/4's staff meeting on 15 November to plan the briefing for the DDP prior to his participation with the DCI in briefing the President elect was the following item stating:

Our [CIA's] original concept is now seen to be unachievable in the face of the controls Castro has instituted. There will not be the internal unrest earlier believed possible, nor will the defenses permit the type strike first planned. Our second concept (1,500-3,000 man force to secure a beach with airstrip) is also now seen to be unachievable, except as a joint Agency/DOD action. Our Guatemala experience demonstrates we cannot staff nor otherwise timely create the base and lift needed. 9/

How, if in mid-November 1960 the concept of the 1,500-3,000 man force to secure a beachhead with an airstrip was envisioned by the senior personnel in WH/4 as "unachievable" except as a joint CIA/DOD effort, did it become "achievable" in March 1961 with only 1,200 men and as an Agency operation? What was being denied in confidence in mid-November 1960 became the fact of the Zapata Plan and the Bay of Pigs
Agency activities from victories in Guatemala, Guatemala's...
The internal situation in Guatemala was a vice versa.

...
In June, $42 million compared to $3 million budget being discussed. The increased budget being suggested was on the order of $44 million for the establishment and operation.

Right hand man and conducted the liaison with the representatives for the establishment and operation. Masek as Alaeos was undertaken. Therefore as Alaeos -- this one near San Jose was by Roberto Alaeos -- that area at another of the phases (estates) controlled by the area at another of the phases (estates) of a tactical training base was undertaken by another of the phases of a tactical training base was undertaken and a major reorganization because from Guatemala undertaken that the ground training activity, a cable of 22 November 1960 to the director of Guatemalan was concerned about the Cuban training ac-

Contrary to suggestions that the President of Guatemala [PM plans 10/1960]

Any effect of the [planned expansion] in your memorandum seems to have occurred long before you could be reading reported in your memorandum seems to have occurred long before you could be reading.

This is disturbing to the overn.

Although Mr. Blissell approved the request, he made

The preliminary estimates of last June 10/1960

The preliminary estimates of last June were revised to meet operational

The revised estimates were being prepared by project funds. The period is new budget estimates were with your approval in the interim.

For immediate approval of the DDP that:
starting

there was a severe lack of qualified senior trainers at the air training base. He noted, for example, that considerable more difficult than what he had encountered at the training base, indicated that the situation was

the review of the situation at JTRAY, the ground

immediacy were unwarranted and unnecessary. * effet-

gestions from headquarters that there had been gross

adverse weather conditions, and, consequently, sug-

the task had been performed on time under the most
even though there had been a substantial cost overrun,

tion of the airport at Retalhuleu. Jake noted that

guier who had been responsible for the recog-

as noted in another volume, especially went strongly

as the special group discussions were going on,

in positions between state and the agency was obvious. 21

of the Guatemalan training bases, the contradiction

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of the Guatemalan training bases, the contradiction

as the special group discussions were going on,
...it turns out that we can acquire policy approval for the real estate in the Interceptor.

As I look ahead, I see that we are currently working on real estate that will soon be available. The recommendation is quite still. I feel that this recommendation is quite solid.

I was outlined to you in my November 16th memo to be used in the manner we intend ourselves to prepare a force of 600 maximum to be used in the manner we intended our assessment. As a result of the assessment, we reviewed our capability and prepared for the recommendation that you [the DPP] with the recommendation we reviewed.

When I discussed my thinking with Col. Hawkins 3,000 cubic yards for a major infrastructure effort.

In a third country, to earn from 1,000 to 2,000 pounds in open, with another major base project, or in the opposing development, I had fairly well convinced myself that it is unrealistic for the headquarters. I had fairly well convinced myself that it is unrealistic for the headquarters.

In closing this report on the visit to Guatemala...
were never pushed more seriously is one of the unresolved
of the Department of State, and why his proposals
persistent advocate of this position was Thomas Mann,
states assume responsibility and so admit. The most
forward with a firm recommendation that the United
special group of presidential consultants ever step
cussions of November 1960, at no point did the
deniability reached near fever pitch during the dis-
even though the discussions concerning plausible
"Mark through the course of the project. Moreover,
issues for the ground forces would continue to plague
near San Jose, but the adequacy of the training facili-
t training program with the opening up of Alesos
some result would be provided for the ground

\[ \sqrt{13} \]

where these people can be put to work. I insist
we have immediately available real estate
the project will be seriously damaged unless
of high policy or because of the situation,
guited to evacuate concentrates for reasons
else is this too strong? It is to say-
Straits "Working Group. I cannot empah-
Mr. Sheenham are engaged with in the
dangeled by the gambit that Mr. Mann and
- errations, however, continues to be en-
meeting. Even our present scope of op-
a maximum of 1,200 and commit them along
additional help from DOD, we would train
I would then agree that, with limited

FOUO

FOR SECRER

RELEASED PER P.I. 102-526 (FK ACT)
NARA
DATE: 1/1/75
questions concerning the Bay of Pigs Operation.*

Esterline's visit to the bases in Guatemala was almost immediately reflected in the correspondence between the field and Headquarters, with specific emphasis being placed on the assignment to the ground training base, JMTRAV, of senior training officers. Similarly it was stressed that there was a priority need to secure Special Force trainers from the Army, on an ASAP basis. Requirements for materiel jumped, particularly in the number of personal weapons which would be required for added numbers of troops in training. With the acquisition of the additional training site in Guatemala from Roberto Alejos, requests immediately came forward for trucks and jeeps to transport troops to these training areas. The

* There also is evidence that at least one of the principal Agency planners, C. Tracy Barnes, contributed to the November confusion. At one point, when serious consideration was being given to the possibility of increasing significantly the training activity that might be done in Nicaragua, Barnes introduced what amounted to moral objections to the association -- or to strengthening the association -- with the Somoza Government. Barnes emphasized that this would go down hard with the more liberal elements in Latin America. 14/ This argument, of course, was very much in line with the position being advanced by the Department of State -- Thomas Mann excepted.
area of Cuba.

defense and resistance center in a selected
600 trained Cubans to establish a paramilitary
army. Amphibious means a guerrilla force of about
about 1 February 1961, land by

as follows:

landed his understanding of the paramilitary planning
of the Deputy Director for Plans, Chief, WH/D, out-
tempt to obtain positive guidance through the office

thus, on 29 November, Col. King made a specific at-

the situation in Washington remained in a state of

even as COS Guatemala was requesting information,

\[ \sqrt{16} \]

Altez and Xulpegas. It would be of great assistance to have

complete story to assist in dealing with

changes in near future and COS feels it

recent cable traffic suggests major

Headsquarters requested:

A cable of 28 November 1960 from COS Guatemala to

Cern reflected in the field's messages to Headquarters.

area over the nature of the program, so, too, was con-

just as there was confusion within the Headquarters

be held intact. It could

the information teams that had been developed could

were indications that the teams were expected that

would create problems, but at the same time, there

Field was aware that the increasing number of trainees
operation.

The area in Nicaragua for the amphibious
men as they are recruited to a stay-

station at-3 for up to 300 additional
platoon for training and provide
president training at once from Guatemala.

C. If continuing in Guatemala the

agreement that training shall continue
paramilitary concept then the agreement as to the

provided.

a. What course of action is ap-

so why and what alternatives are pro-

any other reason open to question? If
not in consonance with policy or for
the proposed paramilitary concept as
state or the Department of Defense view

of the Department of Defense.

above:

the following major questions must now

Col. King then went on:

Having outlined his understanding of the planning,

the force. To that

guerrilla elements who have been
and all additional

force commit to support to the 600-man

organization, train, and lead resistance

organization small paramilitary teams to

(b) continue present operations in
use of small teams infiltrating Cuba and working with
eye agency’s anti-Castro effort as one focusing on the
the end of November 1960, the original concept of the
whatever else can be said, it is clear that by
\[
\sqrt{99} \text{ air and other military targets.}
\]
\(1960 \text{ C. To mount air strikes against Cuban}
\)
\(\text{to be used in ground operations.} \)
\(\text{maritime operations. (No personal}
\)
\(\text{contracted personnel in air and}
\)
\(\text{to use a small number of American}
\)
\(\text{county. The guerrilla forces in the target}
\)
\(\text{supply missions in surf.}
\)
\(\text{To use one Florida base, such as}
\)
\(\text{guerilla. These were listed as follows:}
\)
\(\text{was approved, certain policy approvals would be re-}
\)
\(\text{disseminated by notifying that if the paramilitary concept}
\)
\(\text{Col. Wing then closed this memorandum to MR.}
\)
\(\text{approved.} \)
\(\text{DO} \) 
\(\text{concept is}
\)
\(\text{as can be made will be forwarded to}
\)
\(\text{a detailed and estimate}
\)
\(\text{February. (As stated an estimate}
\)
\(\text{resupply air lift to resistance after}
\)
\(\text{Supplementation of logistic}
\)
\(\text{(3) one reactivated IST.}
\)
\(\text{of both}
\)
\(\text{as instructors in Guatemala or in}
\)
\(\text{officers and enlisted men to be used}
\)
\(\text{Thirty-eighth Special Force}
\)
\(\text{following: (d)}
\)
\(\text{WILL the DOD also provide the}
\)
came to us about June 1960 and that he
my recollection is that it IT Col. Began.

had been, esterline reported:

In rebutting what he thought Began's testimony

since this boy in June 1960.

see that the strike force concept has been in being
1961 IT Col. Frank Began had introduced to the commit-

as it turned out -- that in this testimony of 1 May

as though esterline had been informed -- incorrectly

testified before the Taylor committee. It appears

following the collapse of the day of Pigs when he

was charging were take esterline's remarks shortly

fusion which surrounded this period when the concept

for military support as well. Indicative of the con-

ment for heavy air support for recovery and possibly

yet to be determined -- with the combattant required.

an amphibious assault in strength -- the strength as

gone by the board. What was now to be undertaken was

the dissident elements located within the country had
cause General Taylor is going into very
The foregoing is important only be-

more or less.

to the strength of a reinforced battalion,
think in terms of expanding the force
some conclusions; and we then began to
him. After deliberation, I made a major
was not overthrown without a major
castigating effort being made against
that we talked again, and you [Col. Jack
(probably before the first of October),
when a somewhat later date, thereore.
you leaned to the concept I outlined. It
although without positive study of the
hawkings had an open mind at that point;
ate time. As I recall, you [Col. Jack
- teaming into existing units at the approprior-
the time and that I preferred to put small
that I, myself, was not contacted, but at
that the PM staff had been talking about
the face of all the operations that we held in my office in
any of the strike operation is the first
that we were not, at project level, think-

kind of training they had received.
kind of training the first receive in the same
to train the first receive in the same
the camp with Carl Jenkins, continued
Guatemala. In addition to working on build-
- tanks, this cache, when it arrived in
- in small unit or guerrilla type operation
in Panama was directed
- the training program which was conducted
- memorandum. The training program which was conducted
- on approved philosophy of the operation
- with the project until July 1943 (or 29)
- 29th, 1945. I am sure you [Col. Jack
- that we had
- of our staff -- will find that we had
- or more particularly, men-
arrived with certain ideas which he carried
- I want to warn policy. This, however, did not con-
came from the White House. Is no evidence to indicate that pressure to do this
the idea of increasing the size of the force, there
end of the Bushhower administration -- did support
and of the Bushhower administration -- did support
Special Group during the period from November to the
even though Gordon Gray -- in various meetings of the
in fact, suggested that the emphasis for the building
Small team concept was no longer viable. Escalating,
the emphasis was over, it had become apparent that the
up of Castro's internal forces. By the time that the
the outcome of the election, and, consequently, such
ear year made the Bushhower administration extremely
feasible, however, the president's election of that
and the operation Early in November of 1960, and
operation had been planned to

That the small team concept had become popular with the

about the change in concept to wit:

In a discussion with the author of this history in

Richard Blessel, who was the deputy director for

plans at the time of the day of Puff Operation has a

\[ \text{do.} \]

\[ \text{21} \]

\[ \text{22} \]
that he [Jack Hawkins] had a lesser sense secondly I have a clear recollection was talking about in the time period; but I should be realistic to get up to the size I presented in my estimate number. I remember force; this is an all together problem repeatedly saying to Hawkins and Centre in the briefing in training in the first day so I remember where. I think there were probably under 500 people where I think as early as November -- and I think very clearly to land. So, I also remember very clearly having the feeling that I was been read of the briefing. I ... I [also remember as soon as I did in the briefing earlier that we had to place a change in concept was that by November of the whole planning period and of this I have one of the clearest impressions I have about the change in concept for the operation. He said: however, Bressett volunteered the following observations when discussing the situation in October of 1975:

- It's a rather forced by circumstances. 1975
- It's very difficult for someone
- The operation was rather gradual with

Having noted: rather more positive recollection of the change in
concept of the operation. 24

out of our resources in the light of an altered

of what seemed to me to be the inadequacy

about, but I do remember an awareness

the sort of numbers that I was talking

he wasn't at all sure that he could get

realistic his direct operation, and that

mechanism would turn up, which wasn't

had to rely on what he was recruiting

think that Hawkins likewise felt that he

arm that his plans contemplated...

necessity of a straightforwardly larger and

similar fashion, urging upon Berlin, the

member, at a later stage in a somewhat

plane then contemplated, and I also re-

necessity of a larger buildup than the

was consistently urging upon Hawkins that

I in numbers than I did, I felt that I

of urgency at that point about a buildup

of