there was, at most, minimal attention to the develop-
ment of early November -- when, as noted earlier,
the period from July 1960 through the Presiden-
tal transition was particularly significant. In contrast to
the sudden resurgence of interest on the part of
volunteers of the US government escalated sharply
were involved. On 29 November 1960 the level of in-
ternal intelligence and the deputy director for plans
the highest, and at the agency, both the director of
at the under secretary/assistant secretary level at
principals involved from the department of state were

The CIA, were at the level of the special group. The
decisions and the deceptions, aside from those within
amphibious invasion. During this period, most of the
wartime type operation to a new concept emphasizing
shifty away from what was to be exclusively a guerrilla
the early fall through November of 1960, with the
the activities that occurred during the period from
the previous section of this volume has examined

Presidential Resurgence

Part IV
target. There was some feeling that an
organize the total US effort against the
dont led a discussion as to how best to
dect part of any department... and the Presst-
all done that could be done with all
the President made it clear he wanted

points of particular interest:

the DDP mentioned among other things the following two
report on the session with the President, Mr. Blasell,
his own staff; and Bulters and Blasell of CIA. In this
gates and bongas of defense; Gray and Goodman of
they which intrecio Messrs. Dillon and Merchant of State;
on 29 November of 1960, the President had a meet-

I guess. I
but I would think that was a pretty good
than that. I guess.
other
broter on something that would emerge that
on. I suspect that thing didn't want to
britain on the things that had been going
resulted that they had lost, and they
they [the Republic an administration]
this, it probably had a political basis.
I can't explain it... but I will say

revenge, take revenge, then Chief, WH4 stated:

when asked for an explanation of this sudden
by the Kennedy administration.
decision makers in the period prior to the take-over
suddenly the President emerged as one of the principal
In Central America, expressing himself through or moving any Cubans who may now be thought of moving any Cubans whom he may now be
throughout the entire operation at the time he was extremely important at the
time, this could be done in five basic training. This is a case.
We should recruit several thousand

(2) played in the Guatemala case.
was personally qualified and would be
the single experience involved (he said he
was personally qualified and would be)

(1) The President should appoint a

recommendation to the President,
constitute his [Pawley’s] partisan rec-
necessary, and I inferred that these would
Pawley said that there are two things are

Meeting with President Eisenhower:

Session with Mr. Pawley on the day prior to Pawley’s
According to Libby, the Attorney, who had a long
session with State, DoD, and the Agency’s representatives.
President immediately prior to the President’s ses-
position of William D. Pawley who had met with the
at this time by Mr. Blissell reflect very closely the

The points of view attributed to the President.

- Assistance in connection with
- Felt desirable to use Mr. Pawley’s
- Desirable to be designated. It was also
doctor would make Mr. Blissell reflect very closely the
everall coordinating executive might be
To the right.

"Pawley's" "rest" leadership choices usually being far
focus on the potential leadership for the FRP -- with
considerations with Pawley. He recorded conversations
operational plans per se, estimating appeared to be
most gay in handling this subject during the discussions
during the life of the operation. In terms of the
number of telephone conversations between the two
number of telephone conversations during the
MAF operations indicates not only the numerous face-to-
face meetings between Pawley andEstes interaction with Pawley.

Less, throughout the course of the operation, but also reflected in a
statement that might be mentioned, one might speculate on the
cause for which a provincial government opposition to
the fact that this bridge would establish a bridge
then interfaced with a government in this bridge
and logistical support. He mentioned a
head which would call on us for information
head. Then established a government in the bridge
with additional Cuban elements and
traded Cubans, following up this land
the next month or two, a force of 600
force. The essence of his plan
would be to land in Cuba, presumably in
absolutely not. He said
I asked if he was proposing over

foreseeably as being sure that host would
Conductors: After reviewing a list of potential activities, after reviewing the covert and the other to handle the covert, individuals with principal responsibilities -- one to each Special Group decided that there should be two instead. The Special Group in charge of the anti-Castro program. The difficulty at this Special Group meeting was the President.

The problem that apparently created the greatest difficulty was that the troops could not be transported to the training base. The plan to evacuate was not clear as to whether the Cubans would be taken into Portila as ordinary refugees or whether the evacuation would call for transport of Cubans in training in Guatemala, and that evacuation plans should be kept in readiness in case the evacuation of Cubans in the United States, and that evacuation would continue to be a priority on the train.

According to the memorandum on the meeting, the US would deny it was part of the President's authority, or any training activities in Guatemala, that the day meeting with the President [of the day] the result of the high level meeting (itself) as to what exactly had been decided as a consensus (sic) of views. The Soulkre's assistance in
to act as the officer responsible for the US Government’s
Secretary for American Republic Affairs, Thomas Mann,
Williamson be named as a Special Deputy to Assistant
Dillon suggested that Ambassador Whiting
than one, be charged with managing the anti-Castro
in responsibilities, two senator officials, rather
1960 recommending that, because of the difference
a memorandum for President Eisenhower on 2 December
be, Acting Secretary of State Douglas Dillon forwarded
following the President’s suggestion of 29 November.

/Stanford is in this capacity as a private US citizen.

representative to Pawiety’s plans to visit Argentina.

official status with the US Government, but no one

unanimous agreement that Mr. Pawiety not be given any

must be done by the agency. There apparently was

that this liaison must be done covertly, and that it

and that it

PRD, Mr. Durile recommended that a discussion with the

might also assume responsibility for contacts with the

Mr. Gray’s associates. 

nominations would have to be checked with

barnes. It was recognized that these

on the CIA side, Mr. Durile nominated Mr.

Williamson would probably be the best choice.

aspect of quick availability, Ambassador

things into consideration, including the

It was finally decided that, taking all
the recognition of the government's approval of the suggestions regarding

In response to this recommendation, the President wrote:

... should meet, together with the members of the desegregated representation with Secretary Anderson of the Treasury and maintain close and regular liaison with Secretary Adams of the Secretary of the General

Group Decision and Administration went on to say that the administration's memorandum was submitted to Cuba, and to cooperate with And. We have the direction of the Agency's program with respect to Cuba, and to coordinate the Agency's activities of the Agency into that position, on the coveret side of the Agency's coordination the coveret activities of the Agency.
fact: "willlauer will be instructed that he

directly responsible to the secretary of state, in

that even if Eisenhowel did want William make

to Barnes in this transmitted note, Parriot indicated

of raising the position of William. In an aside

awake of the possibility that Eisenhowel was in favor

memorandum to Tray Barne, Parriot had been made

Group meeting transmitted a copy of the draft of Putin

A Parriot who acted as secretary for the special

hierarchy to the secretary of state. When Thomas

for American republic Affair, to that of being direct-

to assistant secretary Mann, the assistant secretary

to Mr. William from that of being a special deputy

sum is that he elevated the position to be assigned

An interesting aspect of the Eisenhower memorandum

Authority. Therefore, be subject to the approval of higher

outlines, those policies will of course, influence the operating agencies, in their broad

policy for conveying policy guidance to

over activities, nor as to his response

Mr. William to subordinating covert and

special assistant to the state department

be no doubt as to the authority of the

in our foreign relations. These should

long as Cuba remains a critical problem

nate to the secretary of state for so

should have a position directly subordi-

[ Cuba ], except that I think Mr. William

program with respect to that country


Chairman of the Board of Control Affairs (Transport, and Vice-President, and Vice-President. Action as Executive Vice-President, because of his long term association. Good handling of Miller case because of this apparently thought that it had a pretty good handle on Miller case because of this.

The agency apparently thought that it had a pretty good handle on Miller case because of this.
The conduct of Operation Polaris. The details of this history, particularly in the trip to the Commonwealth bases, thus is discussed in the period regarding the assignment of US Army Special Forces. There was also an ongoing discussion during this time.

- Agencey's understanding of which end was up. *10/

Ranks of the Department of Defense concerning the proposal make understandable the construction within the applicable legs and procedures without any detailed knowledge of possible drafts and is off the top of the head.

Please recognize that this proposal is

warranted one proposal and Barnes's comment to Gen. Landstrate when he for
were 600 men or 3,000 men. A rationale such as that would be no different if the size of the invading force cast a distress and might rally round the invaders number of troops, he stated that the number of anti-
when Barnes was pushing for the use of an increased action. In one discussion with Secretary Douglas,
knowledge and apparent understanding of the planned great deal more to say than was warranted by his
or what was wanted. Tracy Barnes seemed to have a
discussions among Agency spokesmen as to what was needed and all operations were some interesting contes.

In the course of these discussions of ground
that such recommendations might be followed
stand that anyone would go on record with the expect-
in the pragmatic world it is difficult to under-
could hardly find fault with this optimistic approach
program. In the best of all possible worlds one
President-elect should be sought for the proposed
case, it was suggested that the concurrence of the
of action that were being outlined. Thus being the
Presidential had approved, or would approve, the courses
the Secretary of State, the Special Group, and the
cussed. These recommendations were made just as it
introduced ideas that had not been thoroughly dis-
by the CIA. Neither the State nor the CIA paper
covered action segments of this paper were prepared
program for the United States. The parliamentary and
state then outlined a unilateral political action
failing in that, action through the Organization of American States
real action recommendations and suggested collective
administration, the State Department directed the policy-
being prepared toward the close of the Eisenhower
In one of the longer and more detailed papers
had some familiarity with the details. "I2
by been briefed by Allen Dulles a number of times and
wished to talk about that. "He [JFK] had previous-
ly been one of the first three items that Kennedy
 mentioned. "Senator Kennedy came to the White House for a brief-
President Eisenhower wrote that on 6 December 1960,

guerrilla warfare to invasion because of evidence of
Project Whirlwind. However, he shifted from small unit
Air Force is virtually nil. " The concept for
was still disrupted and "combat effectiveness of the

The estimate continued, noting that the Cuban Army
reasonably effective security force. I3
or so, these units will develop into a
we believe that within the next 12 months
 into Castro and strongly Communist-influenced;
well equipped, and well trained units loyal
time training basis. However, there appears
is low; many units are still on a part

about Castro's military forces:
SINB also proceeded to make the following observation

that Castro was firmly in control of Cuba. The
the Castro regime was issued, belaboring the obvious
of the Castro military forces, an SINB, proposed for
Casino Program on the basis of the increased efficiency
with WM/4 in the choice of resurrecting the airt-

across changing political and administrative lines. *11
blues in favor of agency positions as opposed to
of various problem areas, indicating his very strong
Ambassador Willauer then proceeded to a discussion
once having had the pecking order set straight.

\[ \sqrt{\text{overall coordination, } 14} \]

term operations in the loose sense of
was the case, noting that he had used the
agency's, Mr. Willauer agreed that this
agencies. Mr. Willauer agreed with the other Interested
to Col. King to Mr. Estertone. Mr. Barnes
to command going from the Director to BlSSID
for operations for CIA with the chain of
nothing that Mr. Estertone is the Director
King asked for clarification on this point.
Treasury, the Executive Director for
operations and minority shareholder. CIA.
Mr. Willauer stated that his role as
of a corporate board with Mr.
explained to him by Secretary Herter.
was
Mr. Willauer stated that his role as
thing to a memorandum of the meeting:
parolee it was an unreflecting beginning, for accord-
attained that he was the President wanted him to handle. Ap-
plain both his role and some of the problems that he
called a meeting with the agency's principals to ex-
was not until 23 December 1969 that Ambassador Willauer
Despite this promotion early in the month, it

Information.
not making evaluations from the same intelligence
appear that the operators and the estimators were
increased efficiency of Castro's forces and it would
capability, equipment, and training of Castro's
the already mentioned improvement in the military
both urged as early a date as possible because of
concerned the logistics of the troop movement; and
out that another reason for firming up the D-Day date
both Jake Estes and Col. Jack Hawkins pointed

It

stated that, in any event, the US would be blamed for
whether the US had a hand in it or not; and he empha-
was going to be revolutionary activity in Cuba.
Castro's position. Willauer also argued that there
economic sanctions would have little or no impact on
strongly committed to support the Castro government,
people in state that since the Soviet Union was so
of economic sanctions Willauer pointed out to the
would work to Castro's disadvantage. On the question
until it could be determined if the economic sanctions
and, moreover, that military planning should be deterred
fact that the OAS would be sure to get in on the act
with the opponents basing their arguments on the
assertion to attempts to set a firm date for D-Day.
For example, Willauer noted that there was a strong
positions being taken by the Department of State.
forces. Esterline also emphasized that most of the arguments urging delay of PM planning, particularly concern re the OAS, had been debated with State for months, and the time had come for direct action.

The WH/4 representatives also stressed that the period of training for many of the Cubans had been extended and re-extended, and that to hold them beyond 1 March 1961 increased the problem of maintaining high morale among the troops. Esterline took the position that the Cubans the Agency was training knew that the US had the force to throw Castro out any time that it so desired, but the months and months of training was indicative, to them at least, that the US was not really interested in the welfare of the anti-Castro Cubans.

During the 23 December 1960 meeting, Willauer's expertise and familiarity with air operations led him to ask almost immediately "why the project is 'so thin in the air'." Willauer was told that the rules of the game were that only Cuban air crews could be used, and this was the reason for the Agency's efforts to obtain permission to use contract American
Without warning up installations we will later need, Hawkins wanted pilots who can work over key targets in a similar manner, a strong case was made for the invasion troops. Opportunity to attack the ships which would be carrying until D-Day, the Castro air force would have an op- it if an attempt were made to withhold the airstrikes to the landings. Moreover, Hawkins pointed out that the course of D-1 and follow-up raids on D-Day prior and military targets, with additional sorties during for dawn airstrikes to take out Castro's air force that it could be done on D-2. If permission were given to that from Col. Hawkins was, "no," but Hawkins said tactial bombing could be done on D-Day. The answer later then raised the question of whether all of the Wiltlayer objected, pointing out that this would give for three days before the invading force landed, concerning the possibility of launching air strikes, it was the subject of considerable discussion. Crews for both resupply and combat, the air opera-
For Secretary

would be to have the Director (the DDI)
customs on the project before 20 January
That the only practical way to get de-

withstanding opinion:

they initiated requests for information, and it was
be sought out to discuss specific problems unless
ment of State was that the Kennedy people could not
Willauer stressed that the ground rule at the Depart-
tween the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations.
meeting with Willauer, concerned the translation be-

one other interesting aspect of this initial

against Castro.

us bases would be made available for the strike
out success, Willauer, himself was positive that no
other closer bases to Cuba than Nicaragua, but with-
had been made to get permission to use US bases or
period. It was pointed out to Willauer that efforts
operation could be in and out of Nicaragua. In this
of the planned air operations, that the air support
out that it was inconceivable in view of the nature
partisan people pushed this idea -- but WH had pointed
or three days -- at least some of the State be-

some discussion of limiting use of this base to only
launch strikes against Cuba. Apparently there was
crop -- the question being whether to burn the cane sugar

Suggestions were made to sabotage the sugar

direct action against Castro.

For the US to get off of dead center and take some

the tenor of the conversation was that it was time

American companies with business interests in Cuba,

International Telephone and Telegraph, and other

subsidiary companies, and representatives from Mexico,

foreign power companies, the chairman of the Freepaper

the president of the America &

Bettingig Company, the president of the America &

company, the president of the Cuban-American Sugar

Jersey, the chairman of the Cuban-American Sugar

president for Latin America of Standard Oil of New

York, and in attendance at this meeting were the vice

who was one of the principal fund raisers for the

men. The meeting had been called by Henry Holland,

day in New York, with a group of American businesses

a meeting that he had participated in the previous

specialized group, Allen Bullis protected the attendees on

during the 21 December 1960 meeting of the

Kennedy via Mr. Rush and Mr. Bowles. 15/1

for state people to try to approach Mr.

committed. It would be very difficult

Mr. Kennedy in person and seek to get him

is different than Mr. Herter’s, to go to

whose position is the new administration
Interested in was getting rid of Castro as quickly
ment of State. He did comment that "what he was
sibility; this was the responsibility of the Depart-
emphasized that policy planning was not his respon-
help us policy planners. Mr. Dulles, of course,
the post-Castro Cuba, which would be designed to
specific papers on issues and programs related to
they were going to undertake the publication of
This group of businessmen also indicated that

cheered the matter with his "associate."
Special group not authorized any action until he had
cautious manner. Gordon Gray suggested that the
and operated by the US Government. In his usual
military plant at Nucora which formerly had been owned

Let's go in order to force the shutdown of the

Laid on Castro. Another interesting suggestion was

and, hopefully, the blame for an embargo would be
the business group was that it was time to get tough
the embargo on food and drugs, but the feeling of
drugs and spare parts for machinery. Dulles opposed
electric power supply; and to put an embargo on food,

fields or run the refiners to interrupt the

nnn
In addition to strong positive suggestions from US business, Brigadier General Lansdale, Office of US business, wanted the Lewises to be in the hands of the Lewises. In any post-Castro government would automatically be in the Cuban interest into a cooperative organization, that more positive steps were taken to force the conversion.

Chips among others. Mr. Lansdale worried that unless Sanchez Arango, Rpto I Gespr, and Dr. Paul formed in Miami to oppose Castro, Manolo Ray, Arrieta

as members of an extreme Lewises group which had formed in R.C., early January 1961 draft, writing for Latin America, for example, forwarded a memorandum to Col., J. C. King in early January 1961 draft, writing for Latin America, for example, forwarding a memorandum.

Michael Lansdale, Standard of Jersey, Vice President, particularly that it should not be left-orientated, orientation of any anti-Castro government in exile, with was also extremely concerned about the possible.

The high-level business group which put this together in this field he had direct response.

how this might be achieved.