that Mr. Rawley was strongly in favor of intervention.

It was emphasized to the possibility of initiating action against

the use of a nuclear gun air base, the political organ.

But the operation against Cuba, the qeustion of

the standing problem of the use of US air bases to sup

on 29 December, and the were, in addition to the

The special group held its last meeting of 1960

It was made to this memorandum is not known.

of paper to Blissell. 1960 Blissell. What, response, if any

An insult that Lansdale would have forwarded this kind

the anti-Castro effort, it appears a rather gratuitous

the study of the subject, and all other aspects of

Inasmuch as the agency had devoted many months to

date's direction researching Cuban political objectives.

had put in two weeks of active duty with OSO at Lansdale

had been presented to him by an Army reservist who

forwarded to Blissell a number of suggestions which

for whatever reason, in late December 1960 Lansdale

also had some suggestions which he made to Mr. Blissell

Special Operations, Office of the Secretary of Defense,
In summarizing intelligence merchant, report of his

ber 1960 present an interesting historical problem.

the minutes of the special group meeting of 29 Decem-

In view of the fact that the US would break

declared to overthrow Castro. 21

be attempted to overthrow Castro. 21

to insure that no abortive small-scale insurrections

agreement that the agency should make every effort

of our support. 20 The group was apparently in

(b) a major revolutionary uprising, (c) massive use

collating statements develops: (a) covert support,

process was unrealistic unless one or all of the
government 21 but Mr. Blissell pointed out that such

beachhead into a full-scale takeover of the Cuban

questioned the feasibility of "expanding the initial

James H. Douglas, Deputy Secretary of Defense

operations aimed at the

Blissell’s proposals for some limited covert action

particular plan of action but they did support Mr.
special group, however, were unwilling to buy this

relation with the Cuban operation. The members of the

over operation against an

\[ \frac{\text{in C.11, J.6 \& J.7, even suggesting that an}}{\text{TOP SECRET}} \]
After the suggestion that the President thought "thinking of some definite action" differed considerably.

"...at the suggestion that the President thought...

that he would like to see a definite...matters before January...

he added...that he would like to see a definite...on the Cuban government. He added that he was interested to think that it might be time to recognize the anti-Castro government. He was brought to see the necessity of action. To take a position that they would like to remove Castro from power, but, lacking initiative to get Latin American countries to take diplomatic action and others should take diplomatic action however, that [President's] thought...

He, [President Eisenhower] thought:

Bishenower meeting of 28 December reported that:

Kemey, General Goodpaster's report of the merchant.

Kemey's, General Goodpaster's report of the merchant.

 mercenaries' report of the merchant.

In contrast to the suggestion that the US break 20th. 22

of other countries some time before January...relations with Cuba. In contrast with Cuba...be desirable, it would be desirable...the cooperation and support of four points: (a) It would be desirable to...The latter read as follows:

the minutes of the Special Group Meeting of 29 Dec.

meeting with President Eisenhower on 28 December,
(footnote continued on following page)

of the issues which, by this time, were common knowledge.
The memorandum then proceeded to run through all

important points have been raised. 25

In the meantime, a number of
difficulties arose which, had an internal DDR
situation. It began as follows: "It has been

practiced in WH/4.

illustrative of this, for example,

material is reclassified ad nauseam, and that Barnes

was C. Tracy Barnes, that a great deal of the written

cases that one of the most voluminous correspondents

view of the records of the Bay of Pigs Operation, and-

the history that exists here had a valid criticism. A re-

*  

Indeed, the whole operational plan

knowledgeable about the status of the operation, and,

either himself or Col. Jack Hawkins, who were the most

high level meetings should have been someone like

operation that the Agency's representatives at such

operation that the Agency's representatives at such

noted, in his retrospective view of the day of Pigs

Kahn, and C. Tracy Barnes. 24

Ambassador Willauer, Assistant Secretary Thomas

membership for discussions on Cuba, be expanded to in-

it also was suggested by Mr. Merchant that the group's

At the Special Group meeting of 29 December 1960,

prior to 20 January of 1961.

it would be "desirable" to break relations with Cuba
the staff. 27 possibly a fourth intimation be retained as members of
that the COS, a communiqueator, and a PM officer, and
relations, there was a great concern within the Agency
before the firm decision was made to break diplomatic

just a few days before. 26 the same information that Barnes had presented to Chefer,

W/H 4. Just a few days before, sent a memo

have suffered a severe case of verbal diarrhea.

rehearsed the

same information that Barnes had presented to Chefer,

a January policy meeting, rehearsed the

presentation for a January policy meeting, rehearsed the

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presentation for a January policy meeting, rehearsed the
to break relations with the Castro government, the

In the few days following the 3 January decision

pretensions should be considered for the near future. "28/

[Page 84] of the meeting was that appropriate

conclusions (sic) of the meeting was that appropriate

but "no definite schedule was agreed upon but the

administration, particularly the Secretary of State,

that it would be useful to invite members of the new

The high level White House meeting also agreed

in the United Nations.

position in the Organization of American States or

again, because of the fear of compromising the US

'Training sites in the US still were denied, in part,'

of training sites to handle additional numbers.

Treaties. This was ruled out pending the suitability

question was raised about increasing the number of

agency planning for anti-Castro activities, the

in the course of the discussion about the status of

or damaged official US property (e.g. Guantanamo).

took aggressive action against US citizens in Cuba

action should be taken unless the Cuban government

inversion in Cuba, and the decision was that on such

there was now cause or reason for direct US inter-

The other subject of conversation was whether
for 0300 on 7 January 1961. Authorization for complete shutdown had been set.

cellent summary of the policy decisions which needed to be taken. Roles, "chiefs," WH/4 which provided an ex-

mittation, Col. Jack Hawkins addressed a memorandum

relations was taking place within the Embassy and
even as the debate over the breaking of diplomatic

by GOC.

maintaining possession of the "Carta de Proteccion," notices on emb doors

on evning 6 Jan [1961]. Swtiss and Swiss amb. destroyed.

etals and crypto material destroyed. All

1 January 1961 at 1638G -- stated

however, the last message from Havana Station on

would not be any extreme compromise." In any event,

CIA's Director of Communications (RAC) directed "there

which remained. Even if all the gear were not destroyed,

to pack up as much gear as possible and destroy that

period, the communications officer was instructed

to counterpart from the Agency. During this hectic

ations officer and retain the services of her male

agency retested control of US communications out of

Havana -- the Ambassador deciding that he preferred
not later than dawn on D minus 1 day.

I. That the air preparation commence

the following:

Then, by specific recommendations, Hawkins urged

contingency disaster. If this is not done, we will be
beached. If this is not done, we will be
shipped makes its final run to the
shipped makes its final run to the

our amphibious assault or neutralize and destroy our
amphibious assault or neutralize and destroy our

Cuban air force and naval forces capable
Cuban air force and naval forces capable

the area is absolutely required. The
the area is absolutely required. The

that contact of air and sea in the objective
that contact of air and sea in the objective

It is axiomatic in amphibious operations
It is axiomatic in amphibious operations

general question of air operations. Hawkins said:

generally speaking of this, he was quite firm. In discussing the

time of air strikes, he also noted that

time of air strikes was basic to Hawkins' plan.

be conducted not later than 1 March 1961. The guess-
be conducted not later than 1 March 1961. The guess-

up of Castro's military forces the strike operations
up of Castro's military forces the strike operations

Hawkins suggested that considering the rapid build-
Hawkins suggested that considering the rapid build-

throughout the program which had been initiated,
throughout the program which had been initiated,

that the Kennedy administration did intend to follow
that the Kennedy administration did intend to follow

assuming throughout the plans that had been made. Assuming
assuming throughout the plans that had been made. Assuming

Kennedy administration was interested in following
Kennedy administration was interested in following

whether the Special Group - that was whether the
whether the Special Group - that was whether the

for resolution of the problem that had particularly
for resolution of the problem that had particularly

against the Castro government. In the course of its
against the Castro government. In the course of its

to be made if strike operations were to be conducted
the context of the air operations.

Part III. A for discussion of the Caiman's role in
history of the Bay of Pigs Operation. Air Operations
take the D-2 air strike. See Volume I of the official

13 April 1961 from Puerto Cabases repeated the high
air operations, even though his much quoted cable of
some US pilots into both the strike and logistics of
his attitude about the need for the introduction of
airfields, and that Hawkins ever changed.

There is no indication that Hawkins ever changed.

DO! for a special group meeting of 7 January 1961.

Rumors was exchanged in preparing Mr. Barnes and the

much the same round indicated in Hawkins memo-

Logistical flight operations.

...31

bases in the United States for the launching of
capability as an advance strike base, and the use of air
American pilots, the use of the Argentine air
in the past, authorization for the use of contact
the lend-lease on Cuban soil, Hawkins urged, as he had
why the logistical support for the troops holding
strike and the air drop operations which could pro-

In order to ensure the success of both the air

tactical air support.

Policy does not provide for the use of adequate

1. That the operation be abandoned if
available be strictly restrained.

2. That any move to curtail the number
mentioning the two-pronged program of CIA action with respect to Cuba.

Mr. Dulles then gave a fairly detailed account of this meeting stated as follows:

on 6 January of 1961. Among other things, the record also was required to make a presentation before the Special Group in the final weeks of the President's

administrative, the Director of Central Intelligence during the course of the frequent sessions of the Special Group members. 

33°

to be replaced without any positive resolution by the Special Group, much of this same ground continued

cussion prior to the 12 January 1961 meeting of the Special Group, again, in this case of the problems that had already been discussed and other of the special questions regarding the bases, the size of the invasion force, and the number of trainers who could be accommodated in the camps, who did oppose Castro. Otherwise, much of the same concern accurately to the sentiments of those Cubans needs for structuring the exilé political group to somewhat more emphasis than Hawkins had given to it.
at the play station.

The invasion had collapsed to unsat Casro until after the
was not fully aware of the plans that were being made.

that the Deputy Director for Intelligence, it is inconceivable

efforts being made in the main, to recruit,Cubans

Deputy Director for Intelligence. In view of the
at this time, the office of operations was under the

organizational

office of operations in Mabani. Mr. William A. Turwell, Jr. of Army's

be noted that Mr. William A. Turwell, Jr. of Army's

and John Warner, legislative counsel. It is also should

operations for PD; Mr. McCollum, director of personnel,

deputy director for support; Richard Holmes, chief of

they were General Cabell, DDC; Colonel L. K. White,

* Other agency personnel in attendance at this briefing.

operation such as took place at the day of pigs

in almost total ignorance of any planning for an

and some of the later "experts." was supposed to be

director for Intelligence, who, according to Schlesinger

that this briefing was Robert Amory, Jr., the Deputy

...to emphasize that among other CIA personnel attended

others writing on the day of pigs, it is important

be made by Arthur Arthur, Schlesinger, Jr. and

because of the subsequent charges which would

the bases. 34

being traced and the supply efforts and
deleed, including the numbers of Cuban

effort and paramilitary efforts in some

million; Mr. Bulters discussed the radio

problem running to approximately $28

he pointed out that this is an expensive

trials and the paramilitary effort. Again

propaganda including radio and publica-
of a committee to ask questions as to the right
raised certain questions as to the right

However, President Eisenhower

sent Mr. Dulles to appear before the Senate Committee.

Republic Affairs, or DDI Dullens, it was decided to
Thomas Mann, Assistant Secretary of State for American
candidates being considered to appear before the Senate,

their explanation of the Times article. Of the two
the Hill on 12 January 1961. In order to provide fur-
on the administration to send a representative up to
but the Senate Foreign Relations Committee did call
appearance of the New York Times article is not known,

whether a meeting had been planned prior to the

say about them. 36

that we were limited in what we could
forces to move into Cuba, I considered
might want some day to assist the regime
attitude. Believing that my successor
we should say nothing at all about this
I decided that
and Castro forces in Guatemala... It
with a map, describing the training of
the New York Times carried an article,

On the morning of January 10 1961

In Guatemala. As the President himself wrote:

broke a story about the training of the Cuban troops
ions against Castro. On that day the New York Times
involved in a meeting concerning the planned opera-

On 10 January 1961, President Eisenhower got
Least overt U.S. logistical support, which will be planned to strike with the main attack force, will be delivered to Cuba by the U.S. on multiple stages. The offensive will be executed by the U.S. forces in two phases:

1. Open U.S. lines of communication with Cuba, or
2. Land the force on Cuba.

The main objective is to overthrow the Castro regime. The primary task of the U.S. forces is to provide logistical support and maintain effective contact with the Castro regime. The plan may have to be altered as an effective means of overthrowing Castro without more overt support might have to be abandoned. This plan (updated) may have to be altered to a degree that the December 6 plan (updated) is a complete failure, at least most of the U.S. forces. This fragment may have to be altered as an effective means of overthrowing Castro without more overt support might have to be abandoned. This plan may have to be altered to a degree that the December 6 plan (updated) is a complete failure, at least most of the U.S. forces.

This fragment may have to be altered as an effective means of overthrowing Castro without more overt support might have to be abandoned. This plan may have to be altered to a degree that the December 6 plan (updated) is a complete failure, at least most of the U.S. forces.

The culmination of the special group discussions, 3/17, of the Chief Executive, 3/17, showed that it is the responsibility of the United States to implement the recommendations of the Joint Planning Committee issued by Witteri in November or mid-November 1960 and mid-January 1961. The report which had taken place with increasing frequency between the United States and the Soviet Union affecting the security of the

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*TOP SECRET*

NARA 20 DATE 6/14

RELEASED PK PL-102-26(FK ACQ)
Perhaps best illustrative of the merry-go-round which the Special Group had been riding for at least two months was Willauer's closing statement:

In our discussions we weighed without coming to a conclusion the advantages of a rapid, effective action by direct war in terms of getting matters over with without a long buildup of world opinion vs. the inevitability of such a build up under any seven month program. 38/

Having reviewed the meetings during the last few weeks of the Eisenhower administration, it is interesting to review the comments of some of those who were principally involved, as they looked back on that period. One of the most immediate responses was found in Fidel Castro's virtuoso performance for the Cuban television audience on 23 April 1961 when he explained the invasion to them. Among other things, Castro claimed:

That on certain occasions, we have also been in danger of direct aggression. This danger always has been lurking about us and at certain times has gathered considerable support in the minds of leading circles of the United States. One of those moments when this type of direct aggression was very near was at the end of December [1960] and the beginning of [January 1961], and that is to say, during the last days of the Eisenhower administration. 40/
So concerned was Castro at this time that he put his armed forces in a state of alert for a two week period, covering the transition from the Eisenhower to the Kennedy administration. 41/

The other principal protagonist at this time, remembered it in a somewhat different manner. The former US President wrote of this period in the following manner:

Covert training of exiles for any possible future operations against Castro was going forward. Units were growing steadily in strength and efficiency against the time when actual tactical planning could be undertaken. In December [1960], I suggested to the State Department that the time might be propitious for organizing a "front" against Castro among the refugees, with the United States recognizing the leader and his associates as the legal government of Cuba, with the proviso, however, that the exiles themselves would voluntarily select from their own number an acceptable "head of government." I added that if they could do so at once, I'd like to see recognition accorded promptly -- if possible, before January 20 ...

So, to the incoming administration, we left units of Cuban refugees busily training and preparing hopefully for a return to their native land. Because they had as yet been unable to find the leader they wanted -- a national leader to be both anti-Castro and anti-Batista -- it was impossible to make specific
embraces that there was no mandate, no
emphasis that there was "no mandate, no
cuba." decries the former president's plan to invade
that could be called a plan to invade
"at no time did I put before anybody any
not rush a decision regarding the Cubans.
judgment that the new administration need
 Eisenhower felt that Kennedy shared this
and, more specifically,

...tence unnecessary. The administration considered this exists-
and interagency upgraded that it could
and especially have been discussed at the
and that the Castro problem. In fact, the
the Castro problem, that the new president's
brought and the new president in dealing
bluntly that there had been no decision at all.
Cuba forces would be used, if at all.
there had been no decision as to how the

The foregoing president stressed that

According to the same interview:

turned the presidency over to John F. Kennedy. 43

"There was no

on 10 September 1965 when he said: "There was no

This was re-emphasized in an interview that he held

there was no specific plan for the invasion of Cuba.

that took place was a training program -- that

is was on the fact that during his administration

In the statement just quoted, Eisenhower's empha-

be doubted. 42

restoration and freedom in Cuba could not

and their readiness to sacrifice for the

their hatred of Castro, their partitions, their

plans for a military invasion, however,
Gray stated:

"I remember the situation very well. At that time, it was only the

Remote Group, and no decisions had been

possibility of landing on the

groups. When they were thinking of the

terms of the old administration. First we were thinking

was sort of happening in the Bushhower

administration. And the concept was one that

writatious. And the concept was one that

strategies went out. Of course, the president,

leadership, the time the Bushhower admn-

There wasn't any military plan in form-

Gray stated:

"It was only that the Bushhower left office. In his own words,

truth because no such choice had been made at the

Gray, in his sense, Gray certainly was telling

something to have focused on an actual site for the land-

The definition of a military plan, however,

military plan.

President, Gray, too, said that there was no

forces and providing them with equipment. Like the

power's administration was on training the Cuban ex-

activity, stressing that the emphasis during Black-

security advisor, also supported this former boss when

Gordon Gray, President Bushhower's National

he was frozen to any position by me. I am

statement, and he doubts that Kennedy felt

commitment by me, or by anyone in my admin-

"
The facilities that would be available for training the forces in the United States (possibly in third countries or in the United States) are limited. The number of troops that should or could be treated, both the weeks from mid-November into January -- the time within which the special group had argued through the issues which the special group had succeeded by Kennedy's ability to be sustained once ashore in Cuba, what was yet critical to both the brigade's landing and the ability of the brigade and an air operations plan which would be plan calling for a major enlargement of the extant forces and related forces became an amphibious invasion -- an intensification of numerous small teams of commandos in November of 1960. What was to have been a concept was the major change that was made in the quarter, as has been pointed out in the preceding discussion, that both Gray and Eisenhower converted...
Thomas S. Gates, Jr. (DOD), and Lieutenant Merchant

(DOD), Thomas Mann (State), Gen. David Shoup (NSWC), and

James H. Douglas, Jr. to Eisenhower himself, were among this group. In addition

the operation, included among this group, were close to

various of his senior subordinates who were closest to

Eisenhower's role in the Bay of Pigs operation. It was

banned as a topic in oral

interrogations conducted with Eisenhower.

and authoritative

information about President

Despite the availability of documentary records

over US intervention to remove Fidel Castro. * 46

personnel (as "volunteers" or contractors), and possible

states), the possible commitment of the United States