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governed or governed by dictators. This is particularly true of the Latin American nations, whether democratically or by military force. It is not that a new philosophy was being introduced, but that it became clear that a new philosophy was being introduced. Instead of turning to the Soviet Union and its allies, the primary interest was the establishment of the "Colossus of the North" with the "apparent" concern for establishing a "dialogue" with the United States. It became clear that Castro's actions were not just in opposition to Castro's actions were not just in opposition to the United States. It is emphasized that the end of the Eisenhower administration in 1959 through the end of the Kennedy administration in 1963, this volume has traced the history of the CIA's

Conclusions

Part VIII
As Castro's threats became more serious, and as increasing pressures were put on legitimate economic interests of the United States in Cuba, pressures within the United States Government led to a decision that Castro must go. With great concern about the impact any overt, anti-Castro activities by the United States Government would have on the United Nations and on the Organization of American States, it was decided that a covert plan of action would be adopted. This was the officially sanctioned program approved by President Eisenhower on 17 March of 1960. It broadly outlined the political, economic, propaganda, and paramilitary programs which would be implemented in an attempt to oust Fidel Castro. CIA was to be the principal action agent for the bulk of the program.

Once the official US position was announced, CIA made organizational plans to carry out the policy. A separate Task Force within the Western Hemisphere Division was established under the leadership of Jacob D. Esterline, on whose shoulder Col. J. C. King, Chief, Western Hemisphere Division perched and peered. Initial concepts of the Central Intelligence Agency called for a propaganda program to be run out of a radio
In March 1960, there should have been an anti-Castro pro-
gram, President Eisenhower reminded quiescent on the
motion, in a speech that followed his decision
support to force the overthrow of Castro.
If the invaders themselves could not arouse sufficient
call, they might call for assistance from the United States Government
base in Cuba, from which a provisional government might
be able to land in force, the acquisition of a defeasible
interest could not be made to one
established, correspondently, the concept changed to one
small teams to organize the dissident groups
and that the initial plan to infiltrate
military strength and training programs were sharply
drew to a close, it became apparent that Castro
was
Unfortunately, however, as the summer of 1960
reportedly were ready to move against Castro.
Training for the numerous dissident elements that
who would go into Cuba and provide leadership and
instructions of cadres of communists and paramilitary insurgents
military programs initially called for the training
publications launched in the area of Miami.
Radio operations out of station WRL in New York City
station based on Swan Island and by agency enhanced

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question of developments of the anti-Castro program until late in the fall, following the election of 1960 and the defeat of Mr. Nixon. At that time Mr. Eisenhower reinjected himself into the program and stimulated action to the point where some of CIA's planners hoped that -- in addition to the propaganda program which was already underway -- paramilitary operations might be initiated. Apparently this was feared by Castro, too, for in his famous TV broadcast on the Bay of Pigs he said:

When our country was in danger of direct aggression and mobilized itself, it waited for the [Kennedy] presidential inauguration thinking that this man [Kennedy] would do something different, because all in all, we didn't understand why a man who assumed the administration of the United States would want to bear the guilt of someone else's mistakes.* 1/

This was not to be, however, for aside from considerable emphasis on the propaganda activity, there was only limited support for sabotage activities prior to the

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* Raul Roa, Castro's Foreign Minister charged that in the Eisenhower administration Vice President Nixon and General C. P. Cabell, ADCI, were two of the most vigorous proponents of direct action, with Cabell proposing air and naval protection for the invasion and, if necessary, use of US marines to hold the beachhead. 2/
portable. It was not. The Mafia operation was run
undercover to determine if this allegation was sup-
one of the operations, through examination of the evidence
plot was a part of the authorized planning for the Bay
including the activities of the impact groups that the Mafia
alleged assassination plots involving foreign leaders,
surrounded the Senate Select Committee's report on
similarly, because of the sensationalism which
Intelligence Agency in its anti-Castro effort.
development of operational planning by the Central
role be constructed to have had a major impact on the
by no stretch of the imagination could Nixon's
an interested Senator officer in the Executive Branch,
played into the proper context. It was the role of
volume has attempted to put the role of Nixon
crimes in planning the Bay of Pigs operation, this
ex-Vice President Richard Nixon was one of the prin-
because it has been so widely publicized that
for its anti-Castro program.
involved in investigations by either the UN or the OAS
diplomacy in order that the United States not be in-
stated concern over the necessary formalities of
end of Eisenhower's administration. These were con-
aside from, apart from, and independent of the formal anti-Castro program which was undertaken by CIA. At most, four or five senior officials -- Allen Dulles, Richard Bissell, Shef Edwards, Bill Harvey, and possibly, Tracy Barnes -- probably were knowledgeable about the Mafia connection and Mr. Maheu.

In terms of Project JMATE itself, the few bits of information which indicate the possibility of assassination attempts against the Cuban leadership also fail to demonstrate any responsibility for their initiation on the part of WH/4. If anything, the evidence would indicate that WH/4's position was one of watchful waiting and wishful thinking that dissident Cubans would themselves eliminate the Castros and Che Guevara. The possibility, of course, that Agency-supplied weapons might be involved in such an attempt cannot be ruled out. 3/

Obviously it would be foolish to contend that those principally responsible for developing CIA's anti-Castro program would have objected to the assassination of Fidel Castro. On the other hand, this was not one of the basic concepts nor intentions of the official program of the Central Intelligence Agency.